A new A320 Captain and an experienced First Officer described an approach into an airport with heavy weather and numerous delays. The Captain's report described a new Captain's task saturated experience and thought processes in a complex high workload aircraft.
Synopsis
A new A320 Captain and an experienced First Officer described an approach into an airport with heavy weather and numerous delays. The Captain's report described a new Captain's task saturated experience and thought processes in a complex high workload aircraft.
Narrative
This was my initial trip as an A320 Captain after completing my Initial Operating Experience. The first leg of day 1 went well. Flight planning for this flight was normal; with our decision to add 900 LBS fuel because of my lack of experience. Enroute; we discussed and decided that we would accomplish an auto land in order to accomplish some of the 'new captain' requirements. I reviewed and briefed the First Officer from the briefing guide in the A320 Flight Manual. We also briefed the approach based on the ATIS (VFR) and our arrival direction. On the arrival; descending to 11;000 MSL; we were given holding instructions to hold at as published. We entered holding and were given an EFC for a planned 39 minute hold. The reason given was unexpected heavy rain shower 'crossing the field at this time.' The First Officer sent an ACARS message to Dispatch informing her of the situation and requested weather information for area airports. He also attempted to get a terminal area graphic of local area using the MISC TG message; but the system was down. While the First Officer did this; I flew the aircraft and made a PA to the cabin informing them of the holding situation. We entered the holding pattern with approximately 7;000 LBS. of fuel. ACARS message was received from Dispatch recommending ZZZ as our best option if a diversion was necessary. A quick bearing/distance check showed destination approximately 50 NM east; ZZZ approximately 110 NM south. The First Officer and I discussed our options and agreed that ZZZ would be our diversion plan. We could see heavy rain shower on the radar between our hold and our destination; but a clear 'corridor' towards ZZZ if we had to divert. We agreed that we would use 5500# of fuel as our 'Bingo' (max hold) to depart holding. At XA30z; with 6100# of fuel; I queried ATC about the EFC estimate; asking if there was any chance that it would be shortened. They answered; 'No.' I told ATC that we did not have the endurance fuel and that we would like to show ZZZ as our new destination and requested to depart holding. ATC response: 'Standby; they think they can get you in to your destination now. They have rain showers on final; but they say they can get you in.' After a quick question to my First Officer ('Are you O.K. with this?'); we were cleared to depart holding with vectors northeast out of holding. I made a PA to the cabin while the First Officer sent a message to dispatch. Fuel was approx. 5900# departing the hold. We flew extended vectors to the northeast and descended per ATC instructions. All PA's were made; passengers seated; checklists accomplished; etc. Monitoring the radar; the First Officer advocated a third airport as a better diversion airport based on our present position and the fact that the heaviest rain showers were now between our destination and ZZZ. I agreed. Approx 20NM northwest our destination; we were given clearance; 'Descend to 4000; maintain 210 KIAS; fly heading 160 to intercept localizer.' With the AP1 engaged; I entered the heading in the FCU; confirmed the altitude on the FD; pulled the FCU altitude knob for open descent and slowed to 210 using speedbrakes and Flaps 1. I told the First Officer that I would use NAV initially to intercept the final because of the distance from the LOC transmitter. I pushed the HEADING/TRACK knob and aurally verified that we had FMAs of HDG and NAV armed. I did not verify course offset value on the ND with NAV armed. ATC amended our heading assignment to 170 and I made the change and verified that NAV was still armed on the PFD. As we approached the course intercept point; ATC transmitted that they were breaking off the approach for another aircraft on final to XXL (parallel to our runway assignment) because of a windshear alert. The radio seemed very busy; and the windshear alert obviously got our attention. ATC followed that call with another transmission saying that the XXC final approach course had only heavy rain showers with no convective activity. I noticed and announced that the FMGC was not intercepting the extended course; and used the heading knob to spin the heading to approximately 210 to come back to final. I would estimate our overshoot at less than 1 NM. I armed LOC and quickly got LOC* as the First Officer communicated with ATC. Because of the overshoot and delayed intercept of the LOC; ATC had not cleared us below 4000 FT and our airspeed assignment was still 210 KIAS. Once established; ATC cleared us to descend to 2000 FT. I do not remember ATC ever giving us instructions to slow. Knowing we were getting high; I immediately called; 'Gear down; Final Descent Checklist' and used full speedbrakes with open descent to descend. We entered a heavy rain shower and the radio was momentarily filled with heavy static. We received approach clearance; I armed APP and engaged AP2. I never asked the First Officer to set the FAF altitude; and now was most concerned with getting the aircraft slowed and configured. We were in IMC conditions because of low visibility with the heavy rain. With GEAR DOWN; Flaps 2; Airspeed 180; and speedbrakes approximately; we crossed the FAF at 2000 MSL. Because we had not intercepted the glideslope and had not reset the FCU alt window; ALT* engaged. After a short delay; I asked the First Officer to set a higher altitude in the window and called for VS 1200 down; managed speed. I disconnected the AP and manually flew the aircraft in a descent. I knew I was still high and correcting. The First Officer later told me he momentarily saw VS >2000 FPM; and I would estimate our altitude approximately. 1200 AGL. (1500 MSL) and 3 NM from the runway threshold. I believe that we descended through the GS at approx 1000 AGL (approximately 1300 MSL); still in IMC. The cockpit was very busy; the GPWS? GLIDESLOPE? Warning activating as we passed through 1000 FT AGL. I began to apply backpressure to stop the descent rate. The First Officer later stated that he thought he heard the Mode 1 'SINK RATE' also; but I can't recall this. The First Officer noticed I had not retracted the speedbrakes; and he retracted them. Just seconds after getting the GPWS warnings; we broke out of the rain shower and had visual with the runway. I momentarily saw VASI indications of being on glideslope (Red over White) but our vector momentarily took us to indications of being below glideslope. I quickly corrected; then over-corrected and got slightly high; before finally stabilizing the approach approximately 500 FT AGL. Realizing that I still had Flaps 3; I called for Flaps full and verified that the FINAL DESCENT checklist was complete. After stabilizing at approximately 500 FT AGL; the remainder of the approach and landing was uneventful. Landing fuel was approximately 4500#; shutdown at the gate 4300#. Obviously; this is not the experience anyone wants on Day 1 of being a new Captain; and I've thought a lot about what happened on this flight. My First Officer and I were able to openly discuss all of the events and replay what had happened so that we could try to learn from this. Some thoughts I've had: 1) If I had known how the situation was going to develop; and with the experience level of my First Officer and the rapidly changing situation; I probably should have considered asking if he would be comfortable flying the approach. We could have decided this early (in the holding pattern) as a backup plan if we did go to our destination. However; we couldn't predict how everything would develop; and the requirement exists for me to fly the first 10 legs after IOE; so this would have been an exercise of Captain's Authority for safety. Also; had we known there would be a windshear alert to any runway at ZZZ1; we would have diverted. 2) You can only use the information you're given. It was frustrating that ATC cleared us to our destination only after we informed them that we were ready to divert to ZZZ. Maybe ATC accepted my call to divert as a MINFUEL call and that gave us traffic priority? 3) I now understand clearly that even though the FMGC may not have the correct FROM-TO waypoints on the FPLAN (PPOS at 1L); it is still possible to be in HDG with NAV armed. I know I verified that FMA twice. My previous flying experience on the B777 would not let you do this; displaying a message; 'NOT ON AN INTCPT HDG.' I will now always try to verify the lateral distance deviation on the ND with NAV armed; also. 4) The snowball-effect of the navigation error intercepting the localizer late; getting high; and hearing the windshear alert to the other runway all contributed to my task saturation. With our fuel state getting low and being a new Captain; my thought was that I had to get this aircraft on the ground and that if I could get the aircraft stabilized by short final; this was the safest call.
Second reporter narrative
Based of what we saw on the radar and ATC PIREPS I agreed with the Captain to press on to ZZZ1. In my mind; I felt this was a good option so long as things did not get worse. We had planned and briefed a CAT II ILS and we were told to expect the ILS. The Captain; being brand new (first day off IOE; first company Captain; first time flying the A320) flew due to qualification requirements. In addition; flying a coupled approach would allow the Captain to meet one of the two autolands for a CIII status and let us go down to lower minimums if the visibility went down. A go-around would be less likely. Committing to ZZZ1 meant ZZZ2 would not be a good option. I pulled up weather for ZZZ3 and presented to the Captain. He seemed to agree that it would be a better option. We were at 4;000 feet and given a 160 heading; 210 assigned speed and told to intercept the localizer. I had cleaned up the box and made from the point a PPOS followed by an intersection and the FAF. Since we were intercepting some distance out the Captain armed NAV to intercept. I was distracted by the static on the radio due to the rain and was listening hard for our radio call sign. What we did hear was ATC saying they had a windshear report on another runway. At that moment I looked down and saw that we were passing through the localizer in HDG mode. The Captain started a turn back and armed the LOC mode. We were queried by ATC if we would be able to get the localizer. I reported I would. The Approach Controller; who was very busy; began assigning short vectors possibly due to the windshear; but possibly due to our overshoot. I scanned the TCAS to see if there was any impending traffic conflict. I saw no one; but I did see that we were just starting to go above glideslope. The Captain said we needed to get down. I believe that the descent clearance was delayed due to the overshoot and the frequency congestion. We had reestablished ourself on the localizer and were in moderate rain showers. ATC got to us and gave us a clearance to maintain 2000 and that we were cleared for the ILS. The Captain pulled for Open Descent; armed the approach; extended the speed brakes and called for gear down and the final descent checklist. I was involved with the checklist and reporting to the tower when I made the determination and said that a coupled approach was not going to work. The Captain spun up the mode control panel (MCP) altitude; turned off the autopilot and called for more flaps. I responded to the landing clearance and continued with the checklist. I noted the speed brake was still extended and called it out to the Captain. He did not respond. I knew he was very task saturated. I stated I'm getting rid of the speed brakes and the Captain looked down to see what I was doing. We had a 'SINK RATE' GPWS call with the runway in sight. The call was disconcerting but the Captain had already arrested the sink rate. With the correction and final flaps extended and the runway in sight; I knew that a go-around was appropriate from such an ugly approach; but at the time a landing based off our fuel state and that the weather was moving on to the airport seemed like a safer option. We landed out of the approach and taxied to the gate. We never encountered any windshear on or saw any indications on the approach. The rain continued onto the airport as the Captain and I sat in the cockpit for a time feeling disgusted with ourselves. We start to recount the series of events that had led us to the point where we felt like we had little options other than land. We were cleared to ZZZ1 at the time we requested clearance to ZZZ2. That was our best opportunity to bug out. 'Aircraft are only encountering rain' led us in the ZZZ1 direction as well as the statement that it looked like we would beat it in. I left the PPOS in the box at 1L in the MCDU base of the fact that the Captain wanted it in the box on the last leg. This was an assumption by me. I heard the Captain say that NAV was armed;but I do not remember cross checking that FMA. The radio congestion; the static from the rain and the windshear report were all distractions. When I had to start reviewing the go-around option after hearing the windshear report; we then were redirected back into the now of getting back onto the same localizer. Because of that we got high...and so on. It went downhill fast. The whole situation turned into a reactive situation rather than a proactive one. The Captain had his hands full and later recounted that he thought it might be better if I flew the plane for the approach based off aircraft experience; but that we had already planned the CAT II approach and he needed to meet his landing qualification requirement. I did not want to try to overload him or tell him how to fly his airplane; just keep it safe and SOP to the best of my ability. I feel like I could have done better; but hindsight is wonderful. ZZZ3 may have been an option; but we landed with about 4.4 on the gas without knowing if the weather was moving in there as well. Just as the Captain; I was led into this situation where we got our backs against the wall. I feel like I accepted the clearance to ZZZ1 based on the plan that things would not get worse. When it did; we had little room to work.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.