A320 Flight Crew reports loss of the Green hydraulic system during climb out. The Yellow hydraulic pump overheats and is turned off putting the aircraft in Alternate Law. The Yellow pump cools and is restored prior to landing at departure airport.
Synopsis
A320 Flight Crew reports loss of the Green hydraulic system during climb out. The Yellow hydraulic pump overheats and is turned off putting the aircraft in Alternate Law. The Yellow pump cools and is restored prior to landing at departure airport.
Narrative
We departed 39 minutes after our scheduled departure time due to a fueling delay caused by needing to drip the left tank. We departed with me as the flying pilot. Takeoff and initial climb were normal through flap retraction and completion of the after takeoff checklist. I was hand flying the aircraft out of 8000 feet with a clearance to FL190 when we got a green hydraulic system ECAM. I turned on the autopilot to offload myself; and took over ATC communication while the Captain ran the ECAM. Things started to happen very quickly as the PTU surged while trying to pressurize the now empty Green system causing repetitive ECAM chimes; the A Flight Attendant called to report loud noises in the cabin; and the Yellow system pump overheated. The Captain was extremely busy running checklists and starting to coordinate with the cabin and dispatch. At this point we turned off the Yellow pump and PTU to get control of the overheat situation. I declared an emergency; coordinated with ATC for a return; and got us started on vectors to the north of the airport. At this point I was back to hand flying in Alternate Law on just the Blue hydraulic system. When the Captain completed the ECAM checklists and did a performance analysis; we realized we needed something like 13;000 feet of runway to land. We did some more holding while conferring with dispatch. About this time the Yellow pump had cooled below the overheat threshold and we regained the Yellow system; alleviating our landing distance problem. At this point we were ready to return for the visual approach. I flew the approach while the Captain did a manual gear extension. We configured early to allow for the gear extension and slower than normal flap/slat operation. The landing and rollout were uneventful with one reverser and light braking beginning at about 100 knots. Our landing weight was 16X;000 pounds; and touchdown was smooth and light. We stopped and shut down on the runway; and fire rescue was in position and communicating with us immediately. They chocked us and checked our brake temps; which we showed at about 255 degrees max. Company personnel arrived to tow us to the gate. Turning onto the lead-in line the tug blew a tire; which was quite loud and we thought was a nose gear problem at first. Three items stand out to me about this incident. First; removing crews after an incident like this is essential. I was ready to continue; and didn't crash until about an hour later. At that point I was extremely fatigued. Secondly; automation (in this case the automatic operation of the PTU) was actually a detriment to our safety. To be able to work the problem and then select the PTU at our leisure would have eliminated a lot of confusion; excess ECAM warnings; and possibly the Yellow pump overheat. If the pump had failed or caught fire the situation would have obviously been much worse. Thirdly; the condensed training (I have only been on the A-320 since January) leaves some knowledge gaps. If it had been me trying to run five or six ECAM checklists at once; we would still be in holding. During training; most scenarios just let you start the ECAM and then it's a new airplane; new day; in order to accomplish too much training in too little time.
Second reporter narrative
Approximately 4 minutes after takeoff passing 11;000 FT we received a GRN HYD SYS pressure low ECAM. We followed the ECAM and turned off the GRN HYD pump on the #1 engine. We informed Departure we were experiencing a hydraulic problem with a possible return to ZZZ. They gave us vectors around the local area while we ran checklists. The Flight Attendant then called saying the aircraft was making very loud strange noises and banging around mid cabin. We then received a YLW HYD overheat ECAM and noted the overheat indications on the HYD sys page. We attributed the problem to the PTU not being able to work because the GRN HYD quantity at this time was now empty. We elected to turn off the PTU which quieted the noise in the cabin and followed the ECAM for YLW HYD SYS overheat which directed us to turn off the YLW HYD SYS pump on the #2 engine. We were now down to one hydraulic system and elected to declare an emergency and return to ZZZ. Dispatch was advised of our dual hydraulic failure and emergency return via ACARS. I advised the flight attendants we were returning and asked them to follow the Cabin Advisory checklists with a return in approximately 15-20 minutes. I informed the passengers we were returning due to an aircraft malfunction. The airplane was now in Alternate Law with the First Officer hand flying the aircraft and working the radios while I ran checklists and consulted with Dispatch. The First Officer was fairly new to the Airbus; but did an outstanding job in keeping us in touch with ATC and handling the aircraft with no autopilot. I reviewed the landing distance charts as part of the procedures and found we could not legally land with the weight we had at ZZZ or any other airport I knew of. The landing distance with GRN and YLW hydraulics inoperative was better than 13;000 FT.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.