An air carrier Captain described noticing an engine bleed leak warning on the takeoff roll. He rejected the takeoff and returned to the ramp for maintenance assistance.
Synopsis
An air carrier Captain described noticing an engine bleed leak warning on the takeoff roll. He rejected the takeoff and returned to the ramp for maintenance assistance.
Narrative
During the takeoff roll we received an aural and visual warning on ED 1 and the overhead panel of an apparent engine bleed leak and/or fire. It was somewhat confusing to me immediately as to what it meant operationally so with plenty of runway remaining and below V1; I decided the safest course of action was to abort the takeoff. A smooth abort procedure was executed and a normal taxi off Runway 7 was performed. The First Officer and I divided the duties of checklist; ATC calls and briefings to both the Flight Attendant and passengers. After those tasks were accomplished; I turned to both the First Officer and jumpseat occupant to confirm what they saw with what I remembered prior to calling Maintenance; and it was quickly apparent that even with 3 crewmembers present; we each saw different indications. There was some confusion over which engine/side it was on and whether it was the 10th or 14th stage bleed that was hot. I took a best guess since the warning went away as soon as I retarded the thrust levers and gave maintenance a call; then briefed the passengers of our intent to return to the gate for some inspections. Passengers were deplaned and with both engines shut down and only the APU running; suddenly another warning activated at the gate indicating a 14th stage bleed leak on the right engine. I had to assume that it was the original warning we aborted for; and adjusted my write-up in the maintenance log. Factors that led to my decision were; thunderstorms on and around the airport so an unplanned alternate was a strong possibility; the sun was straight into our eyes taking off Runway 7 (I hadn't been wearing my sunglasses); I believe the tubes could have been on a higher setting since we terminated that same aircraft the night before; my seat was a little higher than normal with a jumpseater present (therefore I had to look under the glare shield to see the top of ED 1); and we as a crew had minimal rest the night before.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.