A B757-200 crew described a maintenance ferry flight for a repeat Trailing Edge Flap Asymmetry problem which they were not told about prior to flight. The flap asymmetry occurred again and the Captain elected to land without completing the checklist.
Synopsis
A B757-200 crew described a maintenance ferry flight for a repeat Trailing Edge Flap Asymmetry problem which they were not told about prior to flight. The flap asymmetry occurred again and the Captain elected to land without completing the checklist.
Narrative
We were flying a Part 91 Maintenance Ferry flight. Reserve minimum call-out. Captains leg. Flight was uneventful and VMC with a 1000ft cloud layer giving a 4700 ft overcast ceiling. Vectors to short visual final with multiple traffic calls in the area. Captain leveled at 3000 and slowed down and called for Flaps 1 and 5. I got a good ILS signal and we proceeded down the glidepath. Passing 2500; Captain called for Flaps 20 and Gear down. Gear came down normally; but the flaps remained at 5 and we got a TE FLAP DISAGREE message. I grabbed the QRH and said we should go into holding because the checklist takes a while to run. I feel there was a breakdown in communication at this point because I suggested going into holding and the Captain disagreed and stated we do this all the time in the simulator and was comfortable landing with this configuration. I quickly reviewed the checklist which read if flaps indicated less than 20; to use Flaps 20 Vref for landing. I again asked the Captain if they would like to level off and we take vectors back around. The Captain said they were very comfortable with the configuration and didn't want to go around unless I was not comfortable. The Captain slowed to Flaps 20 Speed; and we landed uneventfully in the touchdown zone. (Flaps 30 speed was 107) We did not go through the ALT Flap procedure and elected to land with Flaps 5. I noticed the aircraft was slightly nose high than normal and we floated an extra couple seconds. A little different than most lightweight Flaps 30 landings; but overall not much different than normal. I ran the After landing checklist and said we should not move the flap handle to prevent any further damage in case we had a broken jack-screw and the Captain confirmed. We were met by a Company Maintenance Manager and we told them of the problem we had and that we had not moved the flap handle. He said; 'Great; that's the problem we've been having in folks moving the flap handle after landing.' That's when we were told the aircraft has had ongoing TE FLAP DISAGREE problems and they can't figure out what the problem is. This aircraft has been up at this maintenance facility for the past few months trying to find the problem. We were never notified of the ongoing issues with the Flaps; OR that that's why the aircraft was flying here. The Captain reviewed the logbook back to the last flight release; but no notes detailing the Flap problems were there. Of course; several pages prior to that; we discovered the logbook entries of the Flap issue. Also; this was a Saturday afternoon with no other aircraft launches. No Maintenance personnel ever met us at the aircraft and there was nothing in the paperwork to relay to the crew of the ongoing Flight Control problems with this aircraft. The 3 MEL's in the paperwork were Right AP INOP; #2 Cargo Fire Loop INOP and the Electronic Flight Bag database out of date. I'd like to finish by stating that the Captain and I were a bit rushed in the last couple minutes of the flight and our comfort levels were definitely pushed to the edge; unnecessarily. The current logbook procedures of not reviewing past the last signed flight release as well as no paperwork messages of MEL's; and the lack of any message of the ongoing Flap problems with this aircraft was just the start of an error-chain that needed to be broken before I put the flap handle to 20 at 2000ft above the ground.
Second reporter narrative
I thought I was making a nice; fuel efficient approach and delayed calling for gear and flaps as long as possible. I called for gear down; flaps 20. I immediately noticed the TE Flap Disagree ICAS message and looked at the flap indicator and saw the flaps were at 5. I had started to select flaps 20 speed when calling for flaps 20 but immediately bugged flaps 5 speed and verbalized this. I noticed the flap handle was in the flaps 20 detent. The First Officer quickly got out the QRH and turned to the TE Flap Disagree check list. We quickly went over the checklist and determined we would not have time to move the flaps from 5 to 20 via the alternate method and continue our approach. The First Officer asked me if I wanted to go around or something like that. I quickly scanned the horizon and determined I could not maneuver safely visually with the current cloud layer and expressed my concern about the very high terrain all around the airport and the fact that it was obscured. Since we were on a visual approach; there is no missed approach procedure. It is amazing all the things that go though your head so fast. I also thought about how long would it take for the tower to coordinate letting us fly the published missed approach for the ILS which I knew would give us terrain clearance or coordinate a heading and altitude for us and trust the controllers to keep us away from the terrain. Having spent six years as a radar approach controller; I can't help but think about what the controllers would do for us. At the same time I was thinking about being in an empty (i.e.; very light) 757 with a long runway in front of us with a major Maintenance facility located there. The aircraft felt very stable and we were on a localizer; glide slope; and had PAPI information as well as just plain looking out the window and seeing a good sight picture. I told the First Officer it had been some time; but I had landed with flaps less than 20 in the simulator and taking all these conditions into account honestly felt at the time that the safest option would be to continue our approach and landing with flaps 5. I know this is not normal and said so to the First Officer. I told him if he was not comfortable with me doing this; I would go around and we would go from there. He agreed to continue and re-read aloud the TE flap disagree checklist. I heard him state 'If indicated flap position 20 or less; use Vref 20 for landing. I questioned this because we were at flaps 5. He stated again 'If indicated flap position 20 or less; use Vref 20 for landing'. I reluctantly set my bug for Vref 20 plus five; but continued to fly close to flaps 5 speed until just before the runway. I thought we had gone through the entire checklist. The landing was really uneventful; in fact; it seemed nicer than a normal landing at flaps 30 in a light 757. The nose was a little higher than normal; but as expected; and we did float a short distance; but still; a very uneventful landing. I slowed the aircraft and turned off at taxiway to the ramp. I am not sure when; but I noticed the flaps had gone to 20. The First Officer was running the after landing checklist and said he thought it would be a good idea to leave the flaps at 20. I agreed. I was wondering why none of the people standing on the ramp thought it was odd we still had our flaps down. As soon as someone came into the cockpit; the First Officer told him he left the flaps down because we had a T E flap disagree problem. The mechanic told us yes; that is why this aircraft was here and thanked us for not retracting the flaps because that was helpful to them. I explained to them just how we handled the checklist and that we did not use the alternate flap extension which they seemed to like. These were the facts as I knew them at the time and still thought I had done the safest thing. In hindsight; I would rather have thought about it more and written a more complete report. I will now include facts that have emerged since our landing. The next day; System Operations called me. He said he had read our event reports and asked if anyone had told us about the flap problem before. I said no; the first we knew of that history was on the ramp after landing. Of course I then went through older write ups in the log book and saw that indeed this aircraft had TE flap disagree problems. He apologized for not getting the information to us and thought maybe something in the paperwork about these sort of things might be helpful. I agreed with him. I also said I had the information in the aircraft with me in the logbook; but did not read any more that what was required. I think his suggestion would be very beneficial in giving the flight crews a heads up for potential problems. I know I will not accept a flight to a Maintenance base again without personally making sure I find out from someone what the purpose of the flight is. I don't know how that would help other crew members though. This lack of information prior to our flight was the first link that could have been strengthened. If I had known this history; I would not have accepted a close in visual approach in marginal conditions and would not have tried to fly a fuel efficient approach. I would have asked for vectors to a longer final; preferably on an ILS approach and would have started to configure much; much earlier. Systems Control also asked me if I would call the Maintenance representative because he had some questions. I called and he wanted to confirm that we had not used the alternate flap extension. That is what he had understood from our original de-brief; and just wanted to make sure because he needed that information for the Boeing reps. Several times during our conversation he thanked us for not using the alternate flap extension because it was so helpful to them in solving this problem. As stated before; I based my decision to land with flaps 5 on our actual weight; runway length and wind (very smooth; no turbulence or gusts); particular Maintenance facility; very high terrain around airport that was obscured; and my experience in the 757. I did not know Maintenance would actually want things to happen this way. Of course in the comfort of my hotel room; I got out my Pilot Handbook and read the T E flap disagree checklist. The first thing I noticed was that what I thought I kept hearing 'If indicated flap position 20 or less; use Vref 20 for landing' actually read 'If indicated flap position 20 or less; use flaps 20 and Vref 20 for landing'. Definitely another weak link. I am not sure if I just did not hear the First Officer correctly; or he was not reading the checklist correctly. In either case; we obviously had a communication problem. Was this because we were rushed? I am not sure but want to work on improving my communication skills. If I were concerned about using flaps 20 speed; why didn't I do something about it? I did question it; but when the First Officer repeated the checklist item I thought how can I argue with that? With the information I had at the time; I was trying to operate the flight in the safest manner. Obviously I made an error. I do think I have leaned that we have checklists for a reason and the best course of action is usually following the checklist precisely.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.