A CRJ50 Check Airman in the right seat reported an improper crew alert notification procedure during takeoff following a Generator trip and also an incorrect checklist procedure after takeoff.

Narrative

At takeoff the power was advanced and set. I then looked up at the runway alignment then down to scan the instruments. At this time I noticed a flicker in my PFD and MFD. I initially thought of a failure but everything came back with no noticeable changes or missing information; so as non flying pilot I didn't say anything. Then I noticed the Yaw Damper D2 status message appear but when I looked down at the airspeed we were about 105 KTS and I made the 100 KT call instead of the Yaw Damper. I did this because the Captain had specifically briefed 'above 100 KTS I will only abort for engine fire failure or perception it won't fly.' The YD was not in that so I didn't call it. Upon climb out the GEN 2 message appeared then the MACH Trim. I did call out those messages but below 1000 feet we held calling for checklists. At 1000 feet I called 1000 feet and the Captain called 'flaps up; climb thrust; climb check.' I hesitated because I expected him to ask for the QRH; but I decided the climb check would not hurt anything; so I completed that checklist. I didn't realize that I should not have shutdown the APU until right after I did it. Fortunately; the GEN reset during the QRH; all systems were restored and the flight continued uneventfully. Suggestions: I believe the first problem was I didn't call the malfunctions on the runway. Because the Captain specifically briefed what he would and would not abort for; I feel I was predisposed and made the decision instead of involving him. He might have aborted. I also think that my lack of recent experience in the right seat lead to being preoccupied at 1000 feet and shutting down the APU prematurely. I was distracted with calling ATC; the Captain not calling for the checklist I expected and getting the checklists completed as well as being observed by an FAA jumpseater.