Captain reported an Amber 'OVBD COOL FAIL' and a Status message 'INBD COOL FAIL' would occur when the CRJ-200 Main Cabin door was closed. Maintenance deferred both valves; but could not visually confirm the valve positions. Aircraft took off; but could not pressurize and an air turnback was performed. Captain alleges MEL procedure is inadequate.
Synopsis
Captain reported an Amber 'OVBD COOL FAIL' and a Status message 'INBD COOL FAIL' would occur when the CRJ-200 Main Cabin door was closed. Maintenance deferred both valves; but could not visually confirm the valve positions. Aircraft took off; but could not pressurize and an air turnback was performed. Captain alleges MEL procedure is inadequate.
Narrative
Aircraft had a problem when closing doors. An Amber 'OVBD COOL FAIL' and Status message. 'INBD COOL FAIL' would occur when the Main Cabin door was closed. Maintenance came out and deferred both valves. There were no major Operational items of interest in the MEL; unless a different option was used; which called for unpressurized flight below 10;000 feet. We Take-off and the aircraft does not pressurize so we elect to Return to the Field. Back at the gate in ZZZ; the Mechanic says that the valve Control switch was in the correct position; but there is no way to actually visually check the valve to ensure that it moved to the closed position. Either the Maintenance was preformed incorrectly or the procedure is inadequate; because the work cannot be confirmed; and therefore should not be allowed under an MEL program. Also; the aircraft had a Write up for the same issue in December that was Signed-off as corrected. We either have a faulty valve; or faulty Maintenance; or faulty Procedures.
NASA callback
Reporter stated that one of the procedures used to determine if the two EICAS Status messages would go away; was to Open; and than Close the forward right Service Door. If the messages went away; than Maintenance could defer the 'OVBD COOL FAIL' and the 'INBD COOL FAIL' Status messages without having to perform any action on the valves associated with the messages. But the valve positions could not be visually confirmed.Reporter stated that after they departed and had to Return to Field because the CRJ-200 could not be pressurized; he re-read the MEL and believes the aircraft should not be dispatched with an MEL deferral if the valve positions cannot be verified.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.