DFW Controller voiced concern regarding the new requirement to monitor RNAV departures to ensure they correctly track on RACD mapping; reporter claiming this new responsibility is a distraction from other duty responsibilities.

Date: 2010-01 · Aircraft: Regional Jet 700 ER/LR (CRJ700) · Phase: initial_climb

Anomalies: atc-issue-all-types|deviation-track-heading-all-types|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy

Synopsis

DFW Controller voiced concern regarding the new requirement to monitor RNAV departures to ensure they correctly track on RACD mapping; reporter claiming this new responsibility is a distraction from other duty responsibilities.

Narrative

This is the first time that I have worked a Local Control position since the Agency ordered me to monitor RNAV departure aircraft to ensure that they are in compliance/conformance with their departure procedure. Facility management installed new 'optional' map overlays on our RACDs that depict the departure paths of our RNAV departures. By means of pre-duty briefing item and then by face-to-face briefing with my Supervisor; I was instructed that it was the Local Controller's responsibility to monitor the departure track of RNAV aircraft to ensure compliance/conformance with their RNAV SID. During that briefing I asked the Supervisor what constituted in compliance and/or in conformance with the RNAV SID; he responded that he didn't know. I asked how much of the RADAR return had to be in contact with the depicted line to be on the route; again he did not know. The Supervisor went on to say that the conformance requirement was one mile; but that he didn't know if that mile was centered on the airway or either side of it. Side note; if parallel departures are both 1/2 mile off the wrong side of their airway; they are touching; if they go a mile; they will have passed. Tonight a CRJ7 departed on the FERRA2 Departure which is one of the routes we call an inside track on this flow (south). Approximately 1 mile off the departure end I noticed that the CRJ was still east of his depicted route and advised the pilot of such. He didn't seem too concerned. Three miles or so south I decided to issue traffic on an aircraft that was ahead and to the left of CRJ because I didn't want to keep him on my frequency all the way to ZZZ. He did not say that he had the traffic in sight; but I switched him to Departure anyway. I notified the Departure Controller that the CRJ was east of course. The CRJ's RADAR target didn't touch the line depicting his route until he was about a mile from the first turn at BPARK. I had to spend so much time watching the RACD and making sure that the CRJ was going the right way; or at least didn't turn toward the east side; that I was not able to adequately scan the rest of my movement area. Fortunately it wasn't busy. I may never fly again. Recommendation; the Agency should stop trying to apply band-aids to the RNAV off the ground concept Turn these airplanes away from one another and let them get a little air under them before requiring them to switch over to computer guidance. This is clearly another example to the FAA not having a plan; and covering a deficiency in the system by saying 'Now that we have created procedures that take the 'control' out of 'Air Traffic Control;' it is now the responsibility of the Air Traffic Controller to make sure these planes don't collide.

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.