DEN and D01 Controllers described an event when a military flight was routed through the area and conflicted with DEN traffic; both reporters questioned the actions of the other.
Synopsis
DEN and D01 Controllers described an event when a military flight was routed through the area and conflicted with DEN traffic; both reporters questioned the actions of the other.
Narrative
I was working Local Control 3 and 4. I cleared Air Carrier X on Runway 25 heading 260 climbing to 10;000. About the time that Air Carrier X was rotating I noticed a flight of 4 F16's approximately 7 miles northwest of the airport south southeast bound at 8;500 VFR. I stopped Air Carrier X climb at 8;000. Denver TRACON then called me about the military flight. I told the TRACON Controller that I stopped Air Carrier X at 8;000. I then saw the F16's altitude descend below 8;500. I then told Air Carrier X to maintain 7;000. I also told the TRACON Controller to climb the F16's I had a B757 at the departure end of Runway 25. Traffic information was issued to Air Carrier X and they had the traffic in sight. I issued additional traffic to insure they saw the entire flight since they were spread out. When I was sure they saw all 4 F16's; I climbed Air Carrier X to 10;000. During all of this Air Carrier X exited my airspace to the west without being told to contact departure. There was no time to coordinate this with the DR1 Controller. The F16 flight was not coordinated to enter my departure corridor. I was told the flight was indicating over 500 KTS. Approximately 15 seconds before I noticed the flight I had an air carrier; on a half mile final landing Runway 34R; tell me they were going around. I called Air Carrier X by the other air carrier's company during some of the traffic calls because of the missed approach. Air Carrier X knew that I was calling them and answered all my transmissions without confusion. About two minutes prior to this incident the airport was changing landing configuration from land north to land north and south. This required me to give the TRACON the north departure corridor. With the change in landing configuration this left me very little options to deal with the missed approach without coordination the other Local Control positions and with the TRACON. This was accomplished by the OSIC. Recommendation; insure aircraft remain clear of departure corridors without timely coordination. I doubt that the military required an overflight at 500 KTS and 8;500 MSL in the B airspace.
Second reporter narrative
I took the hand off on a flight of 4 F16's well north; northwest of my airspace when they were at 8;500 FT and headed south. When the Controller that handed them off to me got in my ear to coordinate; he said they had a Class Bravo clearance at 8;500; their radio was not good and that they had not been called inbound to BKF Tower.The flight was traveling at over 500 KTS and headed right for the Denver Tower airspace. I turned them to a 190 heading and descended them to 7;500 FT in order to miss the Tower's airspace and allow for departures to climb above them. They read this back correctly and proceeded to turn and descend. I called them inbound to BKF and coordinated with the Controller to my right since BKF is in his airspace and not mine. During this whole event; I was also working other traffic and coordinating with the Controllers sitting directly beside me on both sides and with Traffic Management regarding other airplanes. The lead F16 attempted to call on frequency to verify the altitude to be 75 or 70; but I did not understand the transmission at the time. I then called traffic off their left which was a B757 westbound off DEN climbing out of 7;200 FT. The next sweep the B757 was descending back down to 7;000 FT. After the flight of 4 was through the path of the B757 jet; I informed them that their radio was really bad and asked them if they had BKF in sight. I told them to proceed directly to BKF and contact the Tower. This flight was not pointed out to the Tower at all; so how did the Controller in the Tower decide on 70 for the departing jet when it was clearly going to climb above the flight of 4 F16's? Had I correctly heard the F16 calling to ask about the altitude; I Would have descended them further to 70 because I saw the B757 at the departure end of the runway as a 'splat' with an altitude of 6;000 something and climbing. There is no way the Tower Controller would have been able to know that I did not indeed descend them to 70. Even if the Tower Controller saw them out the window; there was no way of knowing that the F16's were going to stay at 75. The Controller that gave me this mess told the flight to follow I-25 southbound. This is a major interstate 15 miles west of DEN Tower that is often used for general aviation VFR traffic transitioning the area north and south. However; at the time of his instruction; the flight was over State Highway-85 which is a road 7-8 miles east of I-25. This is the one they followed and the Controller never even noticed. Issuing pilotage instructions to a flight of 4 F16's that rarely ever fly VFR in our airspace; let alone to the north of DEN; was a bad call that lead to this unsafe event. He never pointed them out to the Tower and therefore did not resolve all conflicts before handing off an aircraft to another sector or position. One of the guys here believes these aircraft missed because of the heads up thinking of the Tower Controller that was apparently working a go-around on another runway at the same time. I contend he just got lucky; because as I stated above he really had no idea what was going on and could not have predicted that I did not descend the F16's to 70. The Local Controller was working arrival runways and a departure runway. This is often done up there; but I believe it to be unsafe due to the lower level of experience up there now as we also have here in the TRACON. I recommended that when training new controllers; the map of the surrounding major roads be discussed. Specifically; what they are sometimes used for in aviation; and the common mistakes made with them. Don't hand off aircraft that have conflicts yet to be resolved. If staffing permits; all positions should be open. The Controller that handed the flight of F16's to me was working two positions combined. However; this is D01 and I doubt we had the staffing to avoid this. This also applies in the Tower. Two different controllers should be working arrivals and departures.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.