A320 flight crew is informed after the fact; that they may have flown an aircraft on a Part 91 ferry flight with the over wing exit slides disarmed. The cabin doors were intentionally left disarmed but the crew did not notice that the over wing exit slides had been left disarmed by Maintenance.

Date: 2010-10 · Aircraft: A320 · Phase: ground

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-critical|deviation-discrepancy-procedural-published-material-policy

Synopsis

A320 flight crew is informed after the fact; that they may have flown an aircraft on a Part 91 ferry flight with the over wing exit slides disarmed. The cabin doors were intentionally left disarmed but the crew did not notice that the over wing exit slides had been left disarmed by Maintenance.

Narrative

We were tasked with a Part 91 reposition flight and the flight was routine. After a second reposition flight on a different aircraft and while in a taxi to our overnight hotel we received a call from the crew taking the original reposition aircraft. They asked us if we had noticed any discrepancy with the overwing emergency exit door 'Slide Armed' indication. I advised them that I did not recall any malfunction and the slides themselves do not generate malfunctions to the FWC unless a cover is removed from the overwing exits. As we were a reposition flight only we did not arm the slides due to concern over inadvertent opening of an armed door during a non-normal operation. If the overwing slides were not armed it escaped our notice during the flight. We were only advised of a possible situation by the crew subsequently flying the aircraft we had repositioned. Failure of the maintenance facility to rearm the overwing emergency exit slides may have been a factor; however as I did not notice any slide malfunctions and we did not arm the slides prior to departure I cannot say that this may be the case. It may be helpful to add the overwing slides to the post maintenance inspection procedures and possibly add a slides armed item to the before start or after start checklist.

Second reporter narrative

Before running the after start checklist prior to taxi; I ran my First Officer flow including verification the doors were not armed. The Captain and I made a conscious decision not to arm the slides to prevent inadvertent slide deployment upon arrival. All slides were in agreement of being disarmed; so I continued with the checklist.

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.