A serious breakdown in communication between the Captain and First Officer regarding the Maintenance deferral of a malfunctioning Pneumatic duct temperature sensor ultimately resulted in the refusal of the First Officer and the flight attendants to staff a subsequent flight.
Synopsis
A serious breakdown in communication between the Captain and First Officer regarding the Maintenance deferral of a malfunctioning Pneumatic duct temperature sensor ultimately resulted in the refusal of the First Officer and the flight attendants to staff a subsequent flight.
Narrative
During climb to FL190 we received an Anti Ice Duct Warning MSG. The flight conditions were sudden accumulation of ice and moderate turbulence. I was the flying pilot and requested a call to ATC for a continued climb to get out of icing and also requested the QRH be reviewed. In a very short time the tops were reached and with the additional altitude requested from ATC we were able to quickly leave icing conditions. I coordinated a hold with ATC in order to evaluate and determine the best course of action. I assessed the level of ice accumulated by looking out at the wing and winglet; window frame; and wipers. Ice was accumulated on the non heated surfaces; however; the wing itself was free of ice accumulation. While slowing to a more suitable holding speed; the First Officer emphasized the ice accumulation warning from the QRH and I assured her the wing appeared clean and we were using a prudent speed of above 230K. I also pointed out that it was clearly visible. We contacted the Dispatcher and determined the most favorable weather was at our destination. Fuel was a factor. We could see the back of the system containing the icing to our right and stretching out over our filed STAR route. We coordinated with ATC and went north to join a different arrival following another flight who's crew provided continuous updates. The flight required a descent through a cloud layer and the anti ice was placed back to the on position and functioned normally. The arrival was uneventful until the five mile final when a medical helicopter intruded into the the approach path and the Tower issued a go around. Go around was standard and a quick return for a visual was accomplished; we were watching fuel levels and were at around 3500 pounds. During the second approach the same helicopter departed and the Tower was vocal to them about staying clear. The First Officer keyed up and reported to the Tower that we must land; which I felt conveyed an inaccurate message concerning our condition of flight. We were above minimum fuel and the airport was VFR. Landing and taxi were uneventful. At the gate Maintenance arrived and checked the Anti-ice system. They found an open loop and deferred it. While trying to preflight the next leg the First Officer conveyed to me she was not satisfied with Maintenance's assessment and felt it was unsafe. I rechecked with Maintenance and felt they had done the correct action. At this point the First Officer had contacted the Duty Chief Pilot and she told me that we should check with Maintenance Control to verify that ZZZ Maintenance had done things correctly. She advised she was told by the Chief Pilot she had called that you cannot trust ZZZ Maintenance. I spoke to Maintenance Control and Flight Standards along with the Fleet Manager. I felt that things had been done correctly and it was safe to proceed. I had a difficult time rounding up the crew and coordinating a resolution. First Officer left the aircraft a couple of times leaving me guessing. The flight attendants rightfully became concerned and ultimately refused to fly. The First Officer was unsure of the circumstances and eventually called in fatigued. Flight was canceled.
Second reporter narrative
There was light to moderate turbulence during the climb so; upon the Captain's request; I advised the forward Flight Attendant at 14;900 FT to stay seated until further notice. While I was on the intercom a left and right anti-ice duct warning message appeared (side A and B failed). The QRH warning section said to turn off the wing anti-ice duct and exit the icing conditions. The Captain requested FL230 and we arrived almost on top. Then I requested 250 and we were completely out of the clouds. This took maybe 10 minutes to climb from roughly 15;000 to 25;000 FT; without wing-anti-icing equipment available. During that climb about one and a half inches of ice formed on the front windshield and wiper areas of the CRJ 700. The Captain said the wings were clear of ice but I said that he cannot see the wing to confirm that. As soon as the wing-anti-ice switch was turned off the wing anti-ice caution messages and icing messages appeared and I read the QRH to the Captain. It said to recycle the switch. The wing anti-ice became available again; but we still didn't know what the problem was. Caution messages persisted. We asked ATC for a rerouting to the north to avoid the icing conditions and upon arrival anyways ATC gave us a STAR which did so anyways. We did encounter icing on the arrival as the storm weather was approaching the airport rapidly. On the ILS approach we had to do a go-around because of a medivac helicopter doing an emergency landing to pick up a passenger close to the approach end of our runway. We performed the missed approach successfully but flew into icing conditions again and received vectors back around to the ILS and landed. I advised the Tower that we must land this time as we were approaching minimum fuel and didn't know what was the problem with the wing-anti-ice system. I spoke and walked around the aircraft with two different mechanics who said that they didn't know why both loops A and B failed but there is apparently a glitch in the anti-ice system and they felt the aircraft was not completely fixed and fit to fly. The single loop wing-anti-ice message that failed should have been a status message (Duct mon fail) not an 'all system A and B' failure warning message. I felt as if we needed to park the aircraft until they figured out the whole problem; not just defer one left loop and say all is well; the two mechanics agreed; the Captain disagreed. He said that he spoke to the 700 Manager from the cockpit and he said that an AD is about to come out that states that the CRJ 700 wing anti-ice system has had a rash of these same problems and that the AD will state what we should do. I felt more nervous about flying after that. I filled in the flight attendants about why I felt the aircraft was unsafe to go and three of them decided to not go as well. Scheduling kept sending more flight attendants out to fly with us. The Captain also spoke with the flight attendants and said the left loop is deferred and we're good to go. I disagreed. He said that I did not understand the system. He thought I was naive about the system so he tried to explain the system to me saying the single loop deferral was adequate for Maintenance. Maintenance signed it off and the aircraft is good to fly now. I asked him if we should get the red dual loop warning message again then what do we do in icing conditions at night now that the sun was gone. He said we will just come back in and land. I didn't like that because if it did fail again and we accumulated enough ice; we would possibly crash. The two mechanics agreed that the whole system needed a careful looking at. The stress was already enough the first time around and now he wants to chance it again. Two other guys pressured me to go saying the Captain knows best; which I think he was very wrong. After speaking with the Captain and [the two others]; they all pressured me to go saying that the aircraft was safe and; against my will; I said I would go. In the interim; the flight attendants were calling Scheduling to say they wouldn't go. After all of the steps taken in discussing the failure; speaking with everyone involved; explaining things for three hours; and after 6 hours of stress; I called off fatigued. I was sent to the hotel and the flight was canceled. Crewmembers shouldn't be pressured to fly an aircraft without a thorough search of what the problem was; especially one as serious as this one. This station is a Maintenance Base and they should have troubleshooted the whole system to see why both the A and B systems failed; and why the warning messages came up instead of the single loop status (Duct mon loop failed) message. Just because you don't have an extra First Officer available doesn't mean that we should fly this flight anyways; pressuring the original First Officer to fly it because of all of the money involved. Really; doesn't safety come first? In the past I have experienced a dual wing anti-ice duct warning message on takeoff out and we declared the emergency and landed safely. Last week we had a wing duct mon loop status message that was taken care of appropriately for the failure and properly deferred (single loop failure). So these experiences and the fact that I am experienced with the Company in the RJ's for the past four years; I have passed my written exam in this aircraft with a 98% and the check ride very successfully; should be sufficient evidence that I am not a naive idiot. Maybe my blond hair and being a woman had something to do with the Captain's condescending attitude. One other man also was condescending; I think after speaking with this Captain. There is no place in the cockpit for these attitudes or at our company as we are all professionals trying to do our very best and deserve respect.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.