Following a plethora of runway and routing changes during pushback and taxi; the flight crew of an A320 failed to note the need for flap setting three vice one on takeoff from SNA. When alerted by the First Officer well into the takeoff roll the Captain elected to increase the Vr speed and continue the takeoff.
Synopsis
Following a plethora of runway and routing changes during pushback and taxi; the flight crew of an A320 failed to note the need for flap setting three vice one on takeoff from SNA. When alerted by the First Officer well into the takeoff roll the Captain elected to increase the Vr speed and continue the takeoff.
Narrative
We pushed a few minutes late due to ATC and no maintenance release. We planned for a takeoff on Runway 19R according to the ATIS. After conversations between the Captain and the push crew about brake release without clearance; we pushed. With the initiation of the second engine start the maintenance release started printing on ACARS. We also noticed at that time that runway 1L was in use. We got the latest ATIS and the data for Runway 1L. Captain made the appropriate changes on the flight plan and performance page and I called for taxi. ATC instructions involved back-taxiing on Runway 1R-19L with a couple of taxiway turns before and after. We started taxiing and I selected flaps and was backing the Captain up with the clearance. While on Runway 1R ground told us to contact clearance for a reroute. As I copied the clearance; the Captain inserted the changes. I verified and continued the checklist from the manifest changes. When we went back to ground control they sent us back to tower for an immediate takeoff. The Captain applied full power on the brakes and we started down the runway. As I always do when checking the proper power settings; I glanced at the flaps and performance data. I noticed it called for flaps 3 and we had flaps 1. I told the Captain we should abort the takeoff because we had an improper flap setting. He quickly looked trying to assess. While maintaining directional control he decided to continue because we were accelerating very quickly. He delayed the rotation about 15K and we got airborne.
Second reporter narrative
[I] accomplished first flight-of-day checks and normal cockpit preparation. I conducted initial trip briefing and the briefing for this flight as I would be pilot flying. I expected and briefed departure from 19R and engine failure profile for first flight of day. No maintenance item due to a maintenance walk needed. Operations were notified and they contacted maintenance to remedy. Before Start and Pushback Checklists [were] completed. Shortly before departure time; Operations informed us the maintenance walk around issue had been resolved and to expect new maintenance release. About this time; ground crew called saying checklist complete and release brakes if you want. [We were] told by ATC to hold on gate. I told pushback crew we were instructed to hold. Pushback crew again asked for brake release. I responded that I can't release brakes until I receive pushback clearance. I mention this because it was an additional distraction combined with the following distractions. We noticed that departures were using 1L and First Officer started ACARS request for 1L performance. At this time; we received ATC pushback clearance. Normal pushback and both engines started. The maintenance release came across the printer as we finished engine start. ATC instructed us to taxi 1L Alpha hold short Juliet. As we proceeded; we discussed that we would need a new departure procedure or a heading and vectors departing 1L. This uncertainty was a contributing distraction. Before reaching Juliet; instructed taxi Juliet back taxi 1R Hotel Alpha hold short Delta. As we turned off 1R; we began the before takeoff checklist. This was completed down to the manifest changes line. Flaps had been set to flaps 1. I responded to the checklist item with 1 planned 1+F indicated detent. 1L takeoff performance data called for flaps 3. I am very familiar with SNA departures and should have noticed the mistaken flap setting at this time. I am also very familiar with the 19R pre-curfew taxi routing. I believe the unusual taxi routing combined with the late recognition of 1L being the active runway offered further distraction. As we turned onto Taxiway Alpha; ATC instructed us to contact clearance for new routing. After inserting the new route and altitude; we finished the checklist but were again distracted by the new changes to the manifest changes portion of the before takeoff checklist. We were given line up and wait clearance. The pacing was quick but not hurried. We received takeoff clearance and I held the brakes to 1.10 EPR and selected toga thrust and released brakes. This is the 19R noise abatement procedure but I elected to use it for better performance. At 130;000 LBS; we accelerated quickly. Accelerating through 80 KTS; I heard the First Officer say something regarding the flap setting. By the time I processed what the First Officer said about the flaps; considering our relatively light weight and rapid acceleration; I felt the safest course of action was to continue the takeoff and verbalized this to the First Officer. I delayed rotation to a speed approximately 10-15 KTS beyond Vr. In retrospect; I needed to slow down the operation as our tasks increased. I allowed several distractions and work flow interruptions to affect the safety of our flight.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.