A B757 had TE Flap Asymmetry on final and the crew went around to complete the QRH. The TE Asymmetry indication became a LE Flap Asymmetry after the LE and TE flap selectors switches were moved to alternate. An emergency was not declared but a normal landing followed with speed additives.

Date: 2011-04 · Aircraft: B757 Undifferentiated or Other Model · Phase: approach

Anomalies: aircraft-equipment-problem-critical|conflict-airborne-conflict

Synopsis

Narrative

I was Captain on a passenger flight. The First Officer was the pilot flying. On short final to Runway XX at flaps 20 the First Officer called for the final flap setting of XX. We received a trailing edge flap disagree EICAS message and discreet light. We informed Tower of our flap problem; and went around to run the QRH procedure. I informed the passengers we had to go around due to a light in the cockpit; and we expected to resolve the issue and would be landing shortly. I also briefed the A Flight Attendant that we had a flap problem that I; at the time thought we could clear and we'd be coming back around for a normal landing. I elected to keep the First Officer flying the aircraft initially and ran the QRH procedure Trailing Edge Flap Disagree. During the procedure; when directed to move the LE and TE flap selector switches to Alternate the TE light went out; but the LE light and EICAS message illuminated. I continued the procedure to the deferred items; decent and approach check portion. I now took control of the aircraft to have the First Officer go back through the procedure and make sure that I had done everything correctly; and to confirm it didn't say anywhere to not run the LE flap procedure. The First Officer went through the TE procedure again; and agreed that we should run the LE QRH procedure; which he did. Based on the indications we received during this procedure it directed us to the Slat Asymmetry checklist which he also ran. By this time we were on downwind at 5;000 FT slightly past abeam the field when Approach Control called out a King Air 500 FT below us; which we saw; but that traffic caused a resolution advisory which I complied with by hand flying the RA; climbing to approximately 5;400 FT before TCAS issued the clear of conflict. The First Officer informed Approach Control we were complying with and RA due to that traffic and would be descending back to 5;000 shortly. After the RA approach descended us to 2;500 at which time I re-selected the XX ILS as the First Officer was finishing the LE flap asymmetry QRH and we set our bug speeds per that procedure to an approach speed of VREF 30 + 30 (157 KTS) and ran the deferred items; descent and approach checks. I decided to fly the approach and landing. The First Officer consulted the Abnormal configuration; actual landing distances tables on the ODM; per the QRH and came up with less than 3;800 FT for our configuration. Runway XX being 11;000 FT long. Approach was normal but touchdown was a little firm as I did not want the aircraft to float with the approach speed and configuration. We cleared the runway at Taxiway November and crossed XX at Papa; leaving the flaps down during taxi in. What I would do different. Declare an Emergency. I initially thought we would be able to resolve the flap issue and be able to make a normal landing. By the time I realized that we would not resolve the issue; the multiple checklists and TCAS RA had distracted me from ensuring an emergency was declared. In closing I would like to say my First Officer did a fantastic job; his outstanding knowledge of the QRH and operations manual allowed us to complete a myriad of tasks in a short period without feeling rushed.

Second reporter narrative

I was the First Officer and pilot flying for the flight. The Captain was the pilot not flying. There was one maintenance item on the aircraft which was the Right Flight Director. The maintenance requirement was complied with. Ground operations and takeoff were normal. Passing approximately 2;500 FT AGL; we got a 'NO LAND 3' on the ASA. Once at cruise; the Captain exchanged messages with Maintenance Control. We were asked to monitor Radio Altimeter performance during our arrival for troubleshooting. The remainder of the cruise; arrival and approach were normal until reaching the final approach fix; the marker on the ILS XX. Our configuration at that point was autopilot engaged; gear down; flaps 20 and slowing through 170 KIAS. I called for 'Flaps 25; Landing Checklist' and the Captain selected Flaps 25. Shortly thereafter we received a Master Caution; Aural Alert and the 'TE FLAP DISAGREE' EICAS message. The Captain attempted to cycle the flap handle to 20 and back down to 25; ensuring that the flap handle was in the detent at 25. The message remained and the flaps indicated Flaps 20. I suggested we go-around to troubleshoot and the Captain concurred. The Captain notified Tower of the flap malfunction and the desire to go-around. We were assigned a heading and 2;000 FT. I executed the go-around maneuver and the Captain got out the QRH. After assuring we were above 1;000 FT I increased the speed to 180 just prior to the level off at 2;000 FT. As the speed increased; I called for Flaps 5. The Captain was temporarily task saturated with the performance of the QRH and a radio call; so I selected the flap lever from 20 to 5. I told the Captain that I would take the radios so that he could do the QRH. A short time thereafter I realized that the flaps were not moving and promptly moved the flap lever back to the Flaps 20 position to match the current indicated flap setting. I then confirmed the speed limit for flaps 20 and chose to reduce airspeed from 180 to 170 KTS. As the Captain worked through the QRH; I requested and received vectors to a downwind leg and climbed to 5;000 FT. ATC asked if we required further assistance. I asked the Captain what he thought and he indicated we would not require any assistance and I relayed that to ATC. As the Captain was completing the 'TE FLAP DISAGREE' QRH procedure; he selected both LE and TE ALTN FLAPS switches to ALTN. At that time the 'TE FLAP DISAGREE' EICAS message went away and we got a 'LE SLAT DISAGREE' EICAS message. The Captain proceeded to conclude the 'TE FLAP DISAGREE' checklist down to the deferred items; spoke with the passengers and then indicated that he would like to fly the aircraft for the approach and landing and that he wanted me to take a look at the QRH to ensure everything was correct. I transferred control of the aircraft to the Captain and proceeded to review the QRH 'TE FLAP DISAGREE' checklist. After reviewing that the procedure had been complied with; I noticed at the end of the checklist that there was no indication of 'Do Not Complete the LE SLAT DISAGREE Checklist.' I therefore proceeded to complete that QRH procedure. During that procedure; I was ultimately directed to the 'LEADING EDGE SLAT ASYMMETRY' checklist. I completed the 'LEADING EDGE SLAT ASYMMETRY' Checklist down to the deferred items. I confirmed the Abnormal Configuration; Actual Landing Distances and Approach Speeds in the ODM; as directed by the QRH and found the required distance at our weight of approximately 185;000 LBS to be significantly less than the 11;000 FT length of Runway XX. Shortly thereafter we received a TA on TCAS and an advisory call from ATC indicating a King Air at our 12 o'clock position. I saw the King Air and called it in sight. Within a few seconds; we received a RA on the TCAS initially indicating a 'Monitor Vertical Speed' followed by a 'Climb; Climb Now.' As I transitioned from looking inside the cockpit and then back out; I no longer had the traffic in sight and the Captain began to execute the RA maneuver. I notified ATC of the RA and that we were at approximately 5;300 and were now clear of the conflict and descending back to 5;000 with the King Air in sight again. We had picked up a visual on the King Air while I was making the radio transmission. I then completed the Descent and Approach checklists from the QRH as we were vectored to a base leg. After a brief discussion; we decided that I would make a very brief PA to let the passengers know that we had our issue under control and that we would be landing shortly. At the appropriate time; I completed the Landing Checklist from the QRH. The approach was flown at Flaps 20 and REF30 + 30 per the LEADING EDGE SLAP ASYMMETRY Checklist. Approach and landing were normal and the Captain did an excellent job of flying the aircraft onto the runway and avoiding any excessive floating. I noted on approach that the ASA indicated 'LAND 2 / NO LAND 3'; but after landing; the ASA cleared and no longer indicated 'NO LAND 3.' Taxi into the ramp with a tow into gate was normal with the exception of leaving the Flaps at 20. Upon arrival; maintenance was notified and appropriate logbook entries were made. At the request of station Maintenance; we remained at the aircraft until maintenance technicians arrived so that we could give them a verbal description in addition to the write-up in the logbook and answer any questions that they had. We briefly discussed the issue with the crew that arrived to take the aircraft and then proceeded to the hotel. Upon our arrival at the hotel; the Captain placed a phone call to the Chief Pilot to notify them of the event. After having a little time to consider the event; the one thing I wish we had done differently is to have declared an emergency. It would have been a 'freebie' to have the trucks standing by and might have given us greater separation from other aircraft thereby avoiding the RA.

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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.

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