A fatigued CRJ900 Captain selected the FIRE PUSH button during an approach shutting the engine down when he actually intended to push a nearby GLIDE SLOPE button to cancel a low glide slow warning.
Synopsis
A fatigued CRJ900 Captain selected the FIRE PUSH button during an approach shutting the engine down when he actually intended to push a nearby GLIDE SLOPE button to cancel a low glide slow warning.
Narrative
We were on approach for 26 at our destination. We had a repetitive interruption caution message from an Avionics Bay Door which was causing some distraction. We had been on duty for 15.5 hours and were at the end of a very difficult; stressful 4 day trip which included both late night flying and early morning flying as well as repetitive operations in extreme heat due to multiple aircraft with inoperative APU's. We had close traffic landing in front and behind us. I informed the Captain that I would do a short field landing (intending to let him know that I would be spending minimal time on the runway so that the traffic behind us didn't have to Go-Around). The Captain accidentally pushed in the Left Engine Fire Push switch (intending to hit the glide slope cancel button thinking I would be dipping below the glide slope). The left engine spooled down and the Captain informed me of what was happening and told me to watch my airspeed. We were already over the runway when the engine shut down and I continued and the landing was uneventful. There is no doubt in my mind that the Captain's mistake was made due to fatigue; even though he himself was not aware of the level of his fatigue. I have flown with this Captain on more than one occasion and I have always found him to be very professional; competent and of sound judgment. In addition; he always goes above and beyond to help the operation stay on track. The only explanation for the Captain action during this flight was fatigue; in my opinion. My suggestions are simple: 1) Pilots should never be assigned pairings that operate late into the evening on one day and then early in the morning on another day as this interrupts circadian rhythms and makes it difficult for pilots to adequately rest. 2) Pilots should never be allowed to work more than a 14 hour duty day regardless of the type of flying involved. Supposedly pilot work rules nation wide are being reviewed and should be amended. I truly hope this actually happens and it doesn't get hung up due to politics.
Second reporter narrative
The First Officer and I were on approach when our workload became unusually high. The first event that increased the workload was a runway change 25L to 26 (which we requested) usually not an addition to workload; but it required a significant speed reduction and separation from preceding aircraft. Visibility was a factor (into the sun); but certainly manageable. We then started to experience a 'nuisance' alert in the form of an intermittent 'AVIONICS BAY DOOR' caution message. We were still pressurized; and given our phase of flight I instructed the First Officer to continue. After perhaps more than 5; but less than 10 Master Caution Alerts; I instructed The First Officer to de-select the DCU's in order to quiet the alerts (non-SOP). I did not do this without concern for the 'other' alerts that would be muted. I informed The First Officer to be alert; and that we would be missing some normal altitude alerts which he acknowledged. I took stock of our situation and was satisfied that we were well in control of our approach; on speed; configured; stabilized. When we past 1;000 FT it bothered me that our normal alert system was not active. It was at that time that I noticed that the AVIONICS BAY DOOR caution message was now steady. I instructed the First Officer to re-engage the DCU's. Next thing we hear is '500' perfect; we have our alerts back. Somewhere in here the First Officer informed me that he was going to do a short field landing to minimize time on the runway. I wondered had I missed an aircraft in trail? No time to discuss. Then is when the unthinkable occurred. Truthfully if I hadn't seen it with my own eyes I would not have believed it. In a VERY feeble attempt to avoid a 'GLIDE SLOPE' (GS) alert which I must have thought might occur if the First Officer was going to put it on the numbers. I reached up and without confirmation with intention to depress the GS Cancel button; lifted the guard on the button next to the GS cancel button and depressed the FIRE PUSH switch! I immediately realized what I had done and informed the First Officer to guard his speed and continue. Of course the engine did what it was suppose to do. It's hard for me to even say it. I am still reeling from this incident. The landing was uneventful. After we deplaned; I contacted Maintenance. I briefed the next crew on the event. With maintenance co-ordination we restarted the engine at the gate to verify normal operations. Fire bottle was not affected. I then contacted my Chief Pilot and informed him of my actions. Of course the Avionics Bay Door caution message extinguished during taxi in. Walk around confirmed the door was secure. Maintenance stated they would clean the contacts. The only thing else I can think to add is that I don't believe we were even low on the GS. At the time of the incident the First Officer and I had been on duty for over 15 hours. Our four day trip was in many ways the most difficult 4 day trip I have ever experienced. Our first day was very difficult. We were exposed to extreme heat and high work loads operating equipment without APU's; ground stops for sand storms; canceled segments and a very late finish. I made it to a 'bed' at 1:30 AM. Then the switch from 'late' to 'early'; we had a short night followed by an overnight that required a very early show. The First Officer mentioned several times that he was having a hard time readjusting. Even though day two and three had their issues as well; day four was a very long day. With a return to gate on the last leg I spent nearly 5 hours assisting maintenance with our aircraft problem (as documented) much of this was exposed to extreme heat and exertion. (Opening and closing an engine cowling is apparently a two man job). We were (with time running out) reassigned another aircraft which we continued to have issues with inoperative ACARS; missing load table charts. The whole trip just felt as if we were being conspired against. If there is any real explanation for my actions; I would sincerely hope that I fell victim to fatigue; and that my skills and decision making abilities are not in question.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.