B757 flight crew experiences a Left Hydraulic system failure due to fluid loss during climb and elects to divert to a suitable alternate.
Synopsis
B757 flight crew experiences a Left Hydraulic system failure due to fluid loss during climb and elects to divert to a suitable alternate.
Narrative
We were in the climbout passing 15K when we got a Left Hydraulic Electric Pump EICAS; followed by a Left Hydraulic Engine Pump EICAS; followed by a Left Hydraulic System Press EICAS in quick succession. The Captain continued to fly while I coordinated a level off and worked the QRH. Although I was calm throughout the incident because I was confident in my abilities and experience as a pilot; I had difficulty using the QRH. It got to the point where I decided that even if I couldn't use it completely correctly; I would draw on my experience to come a good resolution. Among my problems included finding the right checklist; no reference in the checklist to running the overweight landing checklist; and inability to find the 'approach climb limit weight' referenced in the overweight landing checklist. We diverted; giving us time to work through these issues. I never did find the approach climb limit weight even with the Captain's help. We landed without incident. This is no credit to the QRH but to our previous training. In other words; we succeeded IN SPITE of our current training. After we landed; my global feeling was that I wished I had received better training using the QRH. In particular; some simulator training would have been beneficial. The index of the QRH is different; as in the syntax and the philosophy. For example; there is a list of checklists inside other checklists that lists procedures NOT to do. This runs contrary to previous training in which we look up all the secondary EICAS failures. Thank God we both have a lot of experience overall and in specific aircraft type. This would not have gone down well with a new Captain and new hire.
Second reporter narrative
About 15 minutes after wheels up we left 14;000 FT for 17;000. First indication of the problem was ECIAS messages L HYD ELEC PUMP and L HYD QTY. We confirmed with the pump switch PRESS light and pulled up the status page to see the L quantity at 0.02 RF. It quickly dropped to 0.00. First Officer pulled out the QRH and began looking for the procedure. First Officer began to go thru the checklist; the first item of which is to turn off the L HYD ELEC PUMP. We accomplished that. About that time we got two more ECIAS messages; L HYD SYS PRESS and L ENG HYD PUMP. We confirmed the L ENG HYD PUMP with the PRESS light on the overhead hydraulic panel. First Officer went to the Hydraulic System Pressure (Left Only) checklist and began working through it. First step was to turn the L ENG HYD PUMP off. First Officer methodically worked his way through the rest of the checklist reading aloud and confirming my understanding. We were getting step descents along the way. First Officer reviewed the Rudder Ratio and noted the crosswind limit of 15 KTS. I made the PA announcement giving the passengers the nature of the problem; the divert airport and time before landing along with some reassurance.The POWER XFER UNIT status message was not displayed so we went with normal gear and flaps extension when I decided to add some drag in an attempt to burn a little extra gas to lighten the aircraft. Before descent from 10;000 FT we were 210 KTS and flaps 5. Extension took considerably longer than normal. It is interesting to note that when we first moved the flaps I was surprised by the grinding sound during their movement. The flight attendants told me it was quite loud in that back; particularly in business (over the wing). As we passed abeam the touchdown zone; we lowered the gear and extended the flaps. 25 flaps felt good. 30 felt good; initially. Shortly after completing the Landing Checklist the aircraft developed a left roll. I snapped off the autopilot to hand fly. It was controllable. We checked the TE FLAP indicator and TE FLAP DISAGREE light and found no indication of a problem. NOTE: After landing the flight attendant sitting at door 2 commented that she noticed the flaps and slats blowing up on the left side! I had not considered that those powered by the left system would have no pressure to hold them in place. Their retraction would explain the roll. The First Officer asked if I wanted flaps 20. I refused at first; deciding shortly after that to experiment a bit. I asked for flaps 25. The roll tendency decreased but did not go completely away. I called for flaps 20. As the flaps came up the roll tendency vanished. The First Officer got the new numbers for 20 flaps and we reviewed the landing: NO AUTOLAND NO AUTOBRAKES NO LEFT THRUST REVERSER MANUAL SPEED BRAKES SOFT TOUCHDOWN. Overweight. The only thing we missed was listed under the Alternate Flap Extension part of the checklist; the GRD PROX FLAP OVRD switch. We missed it because we began doing a normal extension. On short final we got the warning! Landing was spectacularly smooth (even if I do say so myself). The crash crew put chocks on the nose wheel and requested the left engine be shut down. They saw some smoke rising from those brakes. We figured it was hydraulic fluid on the brakes. They took the brake temps and confirmed them normal. We started the left engine and taxied; uneventfully to the gate. Maintenance told me the problem looked like a broken hydraulic line in the left wheel well.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.