A First Officer's FMS was out of date so maintenance MEL'ed it and after takeoff the First Officer; flying pilot; had no PFD nav data because cross side nav data was not selected to display #1 FMS data on both.
Synopsis
A First Officer's FMS was out of date so maintenance MEL'ed it and after takeoff the First Officer; flying pilot; had no PFD nav data because cross side nav data was not selected to display #1 FMS data on both.
Narrative
Prior to departure at gate noted that the dual FMS equipped aircraft showed current NAV data on FMS 1; outdated FMS data on NAV 2. Captain attempted to sync FMS 1 and 2 to rectify outdated FMS 2 data; this was unsuccessful. Captain called Maintenance hoping to have FMS 2 data updated. Maintenance chose to defer FMS 2 using DMI # 34-61-01. Captain followed through with the deferral process and placed DMI sticker on FMS 2 display. Captain was pilot not flying; First Officer was pilot flying. We were] behind on taxi duties due to time constraints relative to deferral responsibilities at gate. On takeoff; as pilot flying; normal initial procedures and calls made ('positive rate' - 'gear up; speed mode; nav mode'). FCP properly set to First Officer's side; XFR button selected; AP indicated First Officer as pilot flying on PFD. Within 700 FT of ground and climbing; ATC queried if we were turning. FD commanded wings level on First Officer's side. Quick scan of PFD 1 and 2 showed discrepancy; First Officer's PFD stated 'NO FLIGHT PLAN' at bottom of HSI display on PFD. ATC then issued a heading of 305 degrees magnetic; aircraft was turned to this heading. ATC asked if we were having a problem; Captain replied no. Captain's PFD was providing normal and proper FMS indications for assigned departure. Further scanning and diagnosis of situation and circumstances revealed that First Officer's PFD display and FD indications were not providing normal NAV indications or commands associated with selected departure. Captain took control of aircraft as his PFD was providing correct indications and FD commands. [We] realized that the deferred FMS 2 was central causal factor for lack of correct course guidance on First Officer's side PFD/FD. In fact the First Officer's PFD had no navigation data available at all. Selecting cross side data using NAV SOURCE selector provided correct NAV data displayed in yellow on First Officer's PFD. Once this was displayed and confirmed to be accurate; control transfer from Captain to First Officer was affected. ATC requested a phone call which was completed by Captain at destination. Hurried departure from gate with last minute significant deferral and associated workload to complete deferral procedure led to omission of noting the operations note associated with deferral regarding the selection and use of yellow data for affected side FMS. Assumption that FMS 2 deferral simply reverted operations to that of a single FMS equipped aircraft additional factor. Fleet mostly equipped with single FMS equipped aircraft; lack of familiarity and operational differences with dual FMS aircraft tertiary; but nonetheless a factor. [We needed] more clarity of notes/warnings displayed by FMS/PFD. [We needed to] place time constraints and pressures aside when important details and instructions reviewed.
Second reporter narrative
After boarding was complete First Officer and I reviewed the FMS to verify flight plan; runway selection; performance; and Deferred items. I missed the note for the FMS deferral that states 'select yellow needles for cross side data on inoperative side.' After lift off and around 600 FT AGL I noticed that the First Officer was not turning toward the first waypoint and stated; 'You need to turn.' The First Officer was flying the command bars of the FMS and noticed he had NO FLIGHT PLAN on his HSI display. I took the controls and ATC queried us if we were making the turn just as we started to make the turn. For this event I would say that the first threat was heavy workload however I was not as thorough as I normally am in reading the fine print of the published MEL for the aircraft. Second threat was the on time pressure and to clear the gate for the next aircraft that was waiting. I am wholly responsible for not catching the statement in the text of the required actions for the condition. The error of the aircraft flight path during the takeoff and climb on the RNAV departure was certainly undesirable and avoidable had I double checked the MEL text and confirmed what I knew was supposed to be done for the MEL item and condition. For myself I would say that just taking another deep breath and reviewing more carefully and reading the text more thoroughly and a double check of all the items listed one at a time. For the MEL it could be organized a little better with some highlighted bold areas where an issue carries a more significant effect on the operation.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.