CRJ200 flight crew and maintenance personnel describe the events surrounding the deactivation of the left thrust reverser when the right reverser was the faulty system. The original write up was incorrect and contradictory but was not caught by Maintenance or the flight crew accepting the aircraft. Both thrust reverser's are found to be inoperative upon landing.
Synopsis
CRJ200 flight crew and maintenance personnel describe the events surrounding the deactivation of the left thrust reverser when the right reverser was the faulty system. The original write up was incorrect and contradictory but was not caught by Maintenance or the flight crew accepting the aircraft. Both thrust reverser's are found to be inoperative upon landing.
Narrative
After the flight landed; the crew wrote up the right thrust reverser with Maintenance Control. When the Maintenance Controller took the write-up; the Controller started to research the events of adding MEL 78-30-01 before the flight departed. It was discovered that during the initial call of the write-up from the Captain to Maintenance Control; the Captain had said the right thrust reverser did not work; but the write-up in the logbook stated the left thrust reserver did not work. The initial call for the thrust reverser to Maintenance Control was from the Captain of this previous flight. There was a crew change; and the new crew added the new MEL 78-30-01 to the release. Before the MEL was added to the release; a 3-way call was performed between the Maintenance Controller; Dispatcher and the mechanic to verify the 2 MEL's that were added. The second MEL was 25-70-10. This is my opinion of what I believe may have happened. When Maintenance went out to the aircraft; they reviewed the logbook and saw the left thrust reverser was in the write-up. Then; the left thrust reverser was deactivated. During the 3-way call; all the participants verified the MEL numbers. I did check the MEL's in the MEL book when they were added. We did not read the MEL from the MEL book; we just verified the numbers. Maintenance Control had made me aware of the MEL's well before the 3-way call took place. The end result was the flight flew with the wrong thrust reverser deactivated. I believe this event was caused by a communication break down at the beginning of the event.
Second reporter narrative
Captain called Maintenance Control and verbally told him that the left thrust reverser (T/R) would deploy. Also the yellow 'REV' icon appears and the Right Reverser (RT Rev) handle would not move past the detent. However; when he wrote it up; he wrote 'Left T/R would NOT deploy. Yellow 'REV' icon appears; RT Rev Handle would not pass detent'. Unfortunately the discrepancy was not caught here. Maintenance Control contacted Station Maintenance and informed them that the right thrust reverser was inoperative and needed to be deactivated. They confirmed right thrust reverser. During that time we are unaware of why the mechanics deactivated the left side. We are assuming they read the logbook and saw the first sentence and that's why they deactivated the left side. When they called to do the logbook sign offs they where originally talking to the newest Maintenance Controller. Because he has never done it before; I told him I would do it and he could listen in. The corrective action on the original block was already mostly complete when I took over. I saw the first sentence and it matched what he was doing and failed to read further. The second half of the write up was missed. The left thrust reverser was reactivated by Maintenance and verified operational and right thrust reverser was verified inoperative and would not deploy. They are currently deactivating the right thrust reverser to MEL it and reactivating the left thrust reverser and will be clearing that MEL. The original write up should be read together in full by the mechanic when he gets to the aircraft and Maintenance Control to verify we are completing the correct maintenance action on the correct component.
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Source: NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (public domain). Reports are voluntary submissions and are not verified by NASA.