What happened
On January 7, 2009, at Lisbon Airport, two separate runway incursions occurred involving firefighting vehicle 09. The first incident began when a Falcon 50 aircraft, operating flight LINCE 020, reported landing gear issues and requested an emergency landing. In response, the Airport Firefighting Service (SLCI) initiated local prevention procedures. While the aircraft was on final approach to runway 03, the crew of vehicle 09 was instructed by their unit chief to advance toward taxiway S1. Despite the air traffic controller issuing instructions for the vehicle to remain off the position, the driver—noting that no runway crossing authorization had been granted—proceeded to cross the active runway. The vehicle crossed the runway approximately 1,200 meters ahead of the landing Falcon 50. No evasive maneuvers were required by the aircraft, though the crew reported the incident to the tower following the landing.
Shortly after, a second incursion occurred. As the local prevention phase concluded and runway 03 was reopened, an Airbus A330-220, registration CS-TOH, was cleared to line up and depart for Caracas. Simultaneously, vehicle 09 was traveling in the opposite direction toward the intersection of the runways. Although the unit chief warned the driver not to cross the runway, and the controller issued a command to maintain position, the vehicle crossed the active runway while the Airbus A330-220 was maneuvering for takeoff.
The investigation
The GPIAAF investigation focused on the communications and operational procedures of the firefighting service. Investigators examined the radio equipment in vehicle 09, a Motorola GM600, finding that the radio was functioning normally and that the volume selector was unlikely to be adjusted accidentally. However, the investigation noted that while the Air Traffic Control (ATC) tower was communicating on Channel 1, the firefighting crew was primarily using Channel 9 for internal coordination with their Operations Command. This led to a breakdown in situational awareness, as the crew did not hear the ATC instructions to stay off the runway.
Findings
- The primary cause of the incursions was the failure of the firefighting vehicle crew to monitor and respond to ATC instructions on Channel 1.
- The crew was utilizing Channel 9 for operational coordination, which prevented them from receiving critical instructions from the tower.
- The unit chief provided instructions to the driver to advance toward the taxiway without ensuring that the necessary runway crossing authorization had been obtained from ATC.
- The driver of vehicle 09 was aware that no crossing authorization had been granted but followed the unit chief's direct orders regardless.
- High ambient noise levels within the vehicle cabin (measured at 74 dB) may have further hindered the crew's ability to monitor radio communications.
Safety action
Following the incidents, Lisbon Airport implemented several changes, including the closure of 'Access C', updates to local prevention procedures, and the implementation of clearer maps for firefighting positions. The investigation also highlighted the need for improved radio discipline and standardized communication protocols within the firefighting service.