What happened
On May 9, 2011, a Bombardier Aerospace CL600-2B19, registered as A6-BNH, was preparing for a flight from Dubai to Dammam, Saudi Arabia. After being held at the runway threshold to allow other traffic to clear, the crew received clearance to line up on runway 30L. During the process of entering the runway and completing the "Before Takeoff Checklist," the aircraft was positioned incorrectly, aligning with the right runway edge line instead of the centerline.
As the aircraft accelerated for takeoff, the crew heard two bumping sounds. At approximately 90 knots, the right wingtip of the CL600-2B19 collided with the PAPI 2 light unit. The captain immediately ordered the aircraft to stop, and the engines were retarded. The aircraft eventually vacated the runway via Taxiway P without any injuries to the three crew members on board.
The investigation
An investigation by the GCAA AAIS examined the flight recorders, aircraft maintenance logs, and airport infrastructure. The inquiry included a simulation test using a similar aircraft type to evaluate cockpit visibility and the impact of environmental lighting. The investigation also reviewed the Air Traffic Control (ATC) procedures and the use of Surface Movement Radar (SML) at the airport.
Findings
- The primary cause of the incident was the incorrect line-up with the runway edge line instead of the centerline due to crew confusion between the runway center and edge lights.
- The crew's situational awareness was compromised by several competing tasks, including monitoring landing traffic, performing checklists, and preparing for the transfer of controls.
- The transfer of aircraft controls between the captain and co-pilot did not strictly follow the established Operations Manual procedures.
- While the taxiway and runway markings were compliant with international standards, the investigation noted that the aircraft's positioning was visible on the airport's Surface Movement Radar.
- High-intensity floodlights located near the runway holding position were identified as a potential factor that could influence crew eyesight during long wait periods.
Safety action
- The operator was advised to enhance procedures to ensure pilot situational awareness and to improve the clarity of control transfer protocols.
- It was recommended that Air Traffic Control Management provide advisory material to controllers regarding the use of SMR as an augmentation tool for monitoring aircraft positioning.
- A recommendation was made for Dubai Airports Company to conduct a safety risk assessment regarding the impact of floodlights on crew visibility.