What happened
On the early morning of 18 March 2019, a Bombardier BD100-1A10 with registration 9M-TST was cleared to land on runway 15 at Sultan Abdul Aziz Shah Airport. The aircraft was performing an ILS approach with 12 people on board. As the aircraft decelerated during its landing roll at speeds between 90 and 100 knots, the crew felt a significant impact.
A visual inspection by the cabin crew revealed severe damage to the leading edge of the left wing. The impact had occurred when the aircraft struck a stationary Perodua Kembara vehicle that was acting as an escort for a runway painting crew. While the three painting contractors managed to flee the runway in their vehicle, the escort vehicle remained stationary. The force of the impact was so great that the vehicle's roof was torn off, with metal fragments remaining embedded in the aircraft's wing.
Emergency responders found the driver of the escort vehicle trapped and unconscious inside the wreckage. Despite being rushed to Sime Darby Hospital, the driver passed away the following day.
The investigation
AAIB Malaysia examined the communications and handover procedures between air traffic control shifts. The investigation established that a lighting maintenance vehicle had requested to vacate the runway at 0215hrs. Following this communication, the duty controller recorded in the logbook that all maintenance works were complete and all vehicles had exited the runway. This entry was inaccurate, as the painting crew and their escort vehicle were still present.
During the shift handover at 0300hrs, the incoming controller was informed that the runway was clear. Consequently, when 9M-TST requested landing clearance, the controller—having visually checked the runway and seeing no obvious obstructions—authorized the landing. The investigation also noted that the contractor's vehicle lacked direct communication with the tower, relying instead on walkie-talkies.
Findings
- The landing clearance was issued based on incorrect information regarding vehicle activities on the runway provided during the controller shift handover.
- The air traffic controller's logbook erroneously indicated that all vehicles had vacated the runway.
- The escort vehicle remained stationary on the runway, and its beacon light was not visible to the tower or the flight crew during the approach.
- There was a lack of direct VHF radio communication between the ground vehicles and the control tower, as the painting vehicle could not communicate with ATC directly.
- The painting crew attempted to warn the stationary escort vehicle by flashing headlights, but the warning went unheavened.