What happened
On 22 January 1999, at approximately 16:07 UTC, a B737-200, registration EI-CKP, was undergoing pushback from Stand 9 at Dublin Airport. The ground crew, consisting of a tug driver, a wingman, a headsetman, an engineer, and a ramp dispatcher, were executing the departure as part of a public transport operation.
As the aircraft reached the red taxiway boundary line, the tug driver initiated a sharp right-hand turn to navigate around construction work occurring on the adjacent apron. During this maneuver, the headsetman's attention was momentarily diverted by movement to his right. As the tug steered into the turn, its front-right wheel passed over the headsetman's left foot, causing him to stumble and resulting in the wheel subsequently striking his right foot. The headsetman suffered a broken left fibula and a broken fifth metatarsal in his right foot.
The investigation
The AAIU investigation examined the maneuvers, the physical environment, and the training records of the personnel involved. At the time of the incident, construction on nearby stands required the crew to perform an earlier and more acute turn than usual to avoid temporary railings. The investigation found that the wingman was focused on the starboard wingtip and the construction boundaries, meaning he did not witness the impact.
Investigators also reviewed the training of the headsetman, who had previously worked as a barman and had only been with the operator for a short period. While company records indicated the completion of safety courses, the investigation found no detailed syllabus of instruction and noted that the training provided was insufficient for the complexities of airside operations.
Findings
- The primary cause of the accident was the failure of the tug driver and the headsetman to maintain continuous eye contact.
- The headsetman moved out of the designated "safe area" where the tug is unable to maneuver without risking damage to the aircraft's nose-wheel pins.
- The presence of construction work necessitated an acute turn, increasing the difficulty of the maneuver.
- The abrupt angle where the yellow taxi-line meets the red taxiway boundary made it difficult for the crew to judge the optimal timing for the turn.
- The headsetman had not received adequate or prolonged training for his specific duties.
- The large diameter of the tug's front wheels and the driver's position on the opposite side of the vehicle contributed to the lack of visibility.
Safety action
Following the investigation, several recommendations were made to improve ground handling safety, including:
- Implementing a formal, five-day theoretical and practical training course for all ground handling agents.
- Establishing a mandatory probationary period under supervision before issuing certificates of competence.
- Developing a detailed training syllabus outlining specific classroom and practical instruction hours.
- Evaluating the installation of safety guards over the front wheels of aircraft tugs.