No fatalities

7 Sep 2008: PIPER J5A (N105F) — Van Wagner Aerial Media LLC — Atlanta, GA

Atlanta, GA, United States

On 7 Sep 2008, a PIPER J5A (registration N105F) operated by Van Wagner Aerial Media LLC was involved in an aviation accident near Atlanta, GA. No fatalities were reported. Investigators recorded the probable cause as: The loss of pitch control due to slippage of the elevator control cable resulting from the maintenance personnel’s improper installation and inspection of the cable. This summary draws on records from NTSB; 13 related events involving the same aircraft type or operator are linked below.

SourcesNTSBPrimary reportUpdated 1778583330Data APIEditorial standards

On September 7, 2008, a Piper J5A (N105F) sustained substantial damage after impacting terrain in Atlanta, Georgia, due to an elevator cable failure. The pilot received minor injuries.

Accident Details

On September 7, 2008, at 1400 central daylight time, a Piper J5A, registration N105F, operated by Van Wagner Aerial Media, LLC, incurred substantial damage when it impacted terrain during a banner towing flight in Atlanta, Georgia. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and a company flight plan was filed for the Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 flight. The pilot received minor injuries.

Flight History

The pilot reported that he had flown 3 hours that day in the same airplane prior to the accident. During his second scheduled flight, he took off and executed a banner pick up maneuver but missed the pick up. He flew back into the pattern and maneuvered for another attempt. At the pull up maneuver—a 30-degree nose up pitch at full engine power—the pilot heard and felt a pop from the elevator cable. The airplane leveled off and he reduced engine power. With the flight control stick in the full aft position, he observed the elevator in the neutral position. He reached behind his seat and pulled on the elevator control cable lightly, causing the airplane to transition into a slight nose down attitude. Pulling on the other elevator cable produced no resistance and no change in pitch attitude. The pilot continued an uncontrollable slight descent into a rough field, where the airplane impacted the ground. He exited the airplane without assistance.

ATC Observation

A controller at the airport’s control tower reported hearing N105F declare an emergency and observed the airplane airborne westbound between runway 27 and the north run-up area. The controller saw the airplane slowly descend westbound and disappear behind the tree lines, approximately 500 feet west of the departure end of runway 27.

Pilot Information

The pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane ratings, and a private pilot certificate with an airplane multiengine land rating. He was issued a second-class medical certificate in December 2007 with no limitations. He reported a total flight experience of 909 hours.

Wreckage Examination

A Federal Aviation Administration inspector examined the wreckage and found that the cable for the elevator nose pitch up control, located at the lower end of the control stick through the attaching thimble, had slipped through the oval sleeve cable swage. The control stick, elevator up and down pitch control cable assemblies, the operator’s cable swage hand tools, and exemplars from the operator’s stock flight control cable fabrication hardware were sent to the National Transportation Safety Board Material Laboratory for further examination.

Laboratory Findings

Examination of the components revealed that the swage for the elevator control cable at the lower end of the control stick through thimble was incorrectly processed; the incorrect grooves on the hand tool were used to crimp the oval sleeve swage. The crimps at the other ends of the elevator cables were properly swaged. The operator did not use a “go-no go” sleeve gauge after each swage to confirm proper processing.

Operator's Actions

The accident airplane, along with several others in the operator’s fleet, had flight control cables replaced, which the operator fabricated in-house. The operator grounded their fleet immediately after the accident. A re-inspection of all flight control cables and swages was conducted among the operator’s 27 airplanes, resulting in the replacement of 36 swages and 41 cables. The operator implemented a new quality assurance procedure for in-house flight control cable fabrication.

Contributing factors

Maintenance personnelIncorrect service/maintenanceElevator control system — Failure