Accident Summary
On January 30, 2009, at approximately 0810 central standard time, a twin-engine Cessna 421C (N345JB) was substantially damaged during a forced landing following the loss of power on both engines during initial takeoff. The airline transport pilot and two passengers on board sustained minor injuries. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and an instrument flight rules flight plan was filed for the personal flight conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. The airplane departed Colonel James Jabara Airport (AAO), Wichita, Kansas, at 0808, with an intended destination of Millard Airport (MLE), Omaha, Nebraska.
Aircraft and Flight Details
The pilot reported landing the previous night with 100 gallons of fuel on board and requested line personnel to add an additional 40 gallons to each tank. On the morning of the accident, the pilot performed a normal pre-flight, boarded the passengers, and taxied for takeoff. The pilot checked engine instruments, magnetos, and propellers prior to takeoff.
Events Leading to Forced Landing
During takeoff, the pilot noted 2,800 rpm, 39 inches of manifold pressure, and all engine instruments were "in the green." While climbing to 3,000 feet mean sea level, the airplane's engines began to lose power. The pilot observed propeller rpms remained at 2,800 but sensed no "power" was being produced. The pilot coordinated for an emergency return. While troubleshooting, the pilot determined a return to the airport was not possible and elected to perform a forced landing. The pilot maneuvered around transmission lines and landed with the gear up in an open field. The pilot called for emergency services via cell phone and attended to the passengers.
Examination and Findings
Examination of the airplane revealed that the fuel tanks contained what appeared to be a mixture of 100 low-lead (100LL) and Jet-A fuel. An FBO line person reported to FAA inspectors that he had fueled the accident airplane with 80 gallons of Jet-A. The accident airplane's fuel filler openings were modified in accordance with Airworthiness Directive 87-21-02 R1 to prevent flattened Jet-A fuel nozzles from entering the filler ports. The placard near the right main fuel tank cap was worn and unreadable; the left main fuel tank cap placard was legible and in accordance with the approved flight manual.
Notably, two Piper PA-46 aircraft based at AAO were modified with Pratt & Whitney PT6A turboprop engines via a Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) that did not require fuel filler opening modification. These STC-modified airplanes had smaller fuel filler openings and placards indicating Jet-A use. The FBO's Jet-A fuel truck had a flattened nozzle, and line personnel had discovered they could refuel the STC-modified PA-46s without an adapter by rotating the nozzle and dispensing at reduced pressure. This method became the standard practice for the accident line person, who reported incorrectly believing the accident airplane required Jet-A fuel despite having refueled it previously.