HISTORY OF FLIGHT

The Andrews Air Force Base (ADW) ground controller, working the ground control (GC), clearance delivery (CD), and flight data (FD) positions combined, authorized four vehicles to cross runway 19R without the local controller’s approval (LC) while VM206, a BE-20, was departing runway 19R. At the time of the incursion, the LC was also the front line manager.

VM206, a BE20, was holding short of runway 19R at the midfield taxiway C waiting to back-taxi toward the approach end of the runway for departure. Four vehicles were holding short of runway 19R waiting for clearance to cross the runway. One vehicle was holding behind VM206 on taxiway C waiting to cross the runway from west to east and three other vehicles were on taxiway S waiting to cross the departure end from east to west. After landing traffic cleared runway 19R, the LC/FLM cleared VM206 for takeoff from runway 19R at taxiway C, permitting the use of the full runway for takeoff. VM206 entered runway 19R at taxiway C, turned left and taxied approximately 500 feet toward the approach end of the runway, turned, and commenced the takeoff roll.

As VM206 was turning and beginning takeoff roll, GC asked LC, “am I crossing?”. The request was not made on a recorded landline as required by local air traffic control directives. The LC responded to GC on the recorded land line, “You’re not crossing”. GC then instructed the vehicles to cross the departure end of the runway. The vehicle operator who was holding behind VM206 again requested clearance to cross. The GC, performing tasks associated with CD, stated in his interview that he cleared the vehicle to cross runway 19R, without visually scanning the runway.

According to the controllers interviewed, the airport movement area safety system (AMASS) did not alarm.

LC noticed the vehicle cross the departure end and directed the GC to stop the vehicle. However, the vehicle was nearly across the runway by the time GC instructed them to stop. The vehicle operator continued across the runway until clear of runway 19R.

FAA Order 7110.65, “Air Traffic Control” states that the local controller has primary responsibility for operations conducted on the active runway and must control the use of those runways. The ground controller is required to obtain approval from the local controller before authorizing an aircraft or a vehicle to cross or use any portion of an active runway and advise the local controller when the coordinated runway operation is complete.

PERSONNEL INFORMATION

Certification and flight experience for the flight crews was not requested. The LC on duty at the time of the incident entered duty with the FAA in 1988 and, with the exception of a short detail to Potomac Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) in 2002, had been an active controller at ADW since 1994. The GC controller entered on duty with the FAA in 2005 and had been at ADW since January 2009. The GC was certified on GC in February 2009.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

Reported weather at ADW at 1145 EDT/1555 UTC was: wind 170 degrees at 8 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, sky clear. Temperature 20 degrees Celsius, dew point 6 degrees Celsius, altimeter 30.38.

AERODROME INFORMATION ADW ATCT was a level 6 ATC facility responsible for ATC services for aircraft arriving and departing ADW and for aircraft overflying and transitioning through ADW airspace. ADW averaged 113,000 operations per year.

ATC STAFFING

Facility staffing included 4 front line managers, 10 full professional level /controllers in charge, 1 FPL non-CIC, and 4 developmental/trainee controllers. At the time of the incursion, 7 controllers were working the shift, three in the tower cab. The LC/FLM,, one GC/, CD/FD, and a developmental not qualified at any position in the ATCT observing operations. The remaining controllers were outside the cab in meetings or on break.

ATC DOCUMENTATION

FAA Form 7230-10, air traffic controller position logs, indicated that a controller was signed on and working the local control position during the incident when in fact the FLM had assumed the position approximately 20 minutes prior to the time indicated and had failed to sign on the position log.

FAA Form 7230-4, Daily Record of Facility Operation (Tower Log), indicated that the radar and all communications went out of service at 1459 and returned to service at 1515 (estimated). This equipment discrepancy would have caused ADW ATCT to declare ATC zero and required the facility to transfer its ATC responsibilities to another ATC facility. The air traffic manager was not aware of these log entries but was confident that the facility did not declare ATC zero.

ATC EQUIPMENT

According to the two controller on duty at the time of the incursion, the AMASS did not alarm for the incursion. The investigative team was not able to review the event because, according to ADW ATCT technical operations, AMASS had a corrupted file caused by a power surge to the local power grid about two hours after the event that erased the data. The power conditioning system designed to prevent power surge disruptions did not operate as expected. According to the ADW airport surface detection equipment (ASDE) Simplified Automated Logging (SAL) Log Entry Report for May/2009 – June/2009, the AMASS had been repaired at 1145 on May 12, 2009 after replacing the voice processor and computer indicator boards. AMASS was placed on line, tested and returned to service following this repair. According to the ADW ATCT FAA Form 7230-4, Daily Record of Facility Operation, the AMASS was operating normally until 1503 on May 13, 2009, when it was logged out of service (OTS). According to the ADW airport surface detection equipment (ASDE) Simplified Automated Logging (SAL) Log Entry Report for May/2009 – June/2009, the ASDE/AMASS suffered a power bump/surge at 1445 on May 13, 2009.