On January 27, 2013, about 0930 eastern standard time, an experimental, amateur-built, Shoemaker KR-2, N27CE, registered to and operated by a private individual, was substantially damaged during a forced landing in a field near Palmetto, Florida, shortly after takeoff from Airport Manatee (48X). Visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and no flight plan was filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal, local flight from 48X. The private rated pilot, the sole occupant, sustained serious injuries. The flight originated about 1 minute earlier from 48X.
The pilot stated that before departure he added 5 gallons of fuel from a container to the aircraft’s 16 gallon fuel tank which nearly filled it bringing the total amount of fuel in the tank to between 14 and 15 gallons. He further reported that it is his practice to always fill the fuel tank before departure, and he typically flies 1 hour. He started the engine and taxied to runway 07, where he performed an engine run-up before takeoff. No discrepancies were reported and he checked the gauges before takeoff and everything was satisfactory.
He applied full throttle and noted the rpm was 3,300 (typical rpm for full throttle though maximum red line rpm is 3,600). He accelerated to 60 miles-per-hour (mph) and rotated, then while flying just above the runway surface accelerated to 80 mph and then began to climb. When the flight was between 300 and 400 feet in a climb attitude, the engine quit suddenly and the propeller stopped; there was no vibration. He pushed the nose forward to maintain airspeed and avoid stalling the airplane and maneuvered the airplane for a forced landing in a field. Before touchdown he maneuvered to avoid a cow ahead and impacted the ground in a right wing low attitude. He stated that the ground was soggy and lumpy, and it is likely that the outcome would have been the same because of the ground condition if he had not had to maneuver to avoid the cow. He stated that he was wearing the seatbelt and shoulder harness and did not recall his speed at touchdown. He was taken to a hospital for treatment of his injuries and remained hospitalized for 5 to 6 days.
Inspection of the accident site by an FAA inspector-in-charge (FAA-IIC) about 2 hours after the accident revealed the fuel tank and engine were separated. The FAA inspector also reported that neither he nor first responders noted evidence of fuel spillage or the smell of fuel. Approximately 2 ounces fuel were recovered from the separated aluminum fuel tank. The first responder who moved the aircraft’s fuel tank away from the wreckage reported to the FAA inspector that it did not appear to contain any fuel. The wreckage was recovered for further examination.
Two days after the accident the FAA-IIC interviewed the pilot while hospitalized and the pilot informed him that the engine quit during climb out at 300 feet. The FAA-IIC asked the pilot about the maintenance records and record of the last condition inspection and was advised he did not know the whereabouts of them and did not conduct annual condition inspections in accordance with the aircraft operating limitations. The pilot also stated that he did not comply with the Flight Review requirements of 14 CFR Part 61.56, and he used 1 of 2 five-gallon containers in his hangar to fuel the airplane.
Following the interview the FAA inspector went back to the pilot’s hangar and observed 2 five-gallon containers. One container was full of fuel and the other was “’bone’ dry.”
Inspection of the engine was performed following recovery of the airplane by an FAA airworthiness inspector. The inspector noted that the propeller blades were broken off at the propeller hub. The carburetor was removed and disassembled which revealed no fuel remaining inside. The fuel strainer bowl was removed and about 1 cc of fuel was noted; moderate contamination was also noted. The fuel supply line from the fuel tank was torn off about 6 inches aft of the engine firewall consistent with fuel tank separation from the airplane. Rotation of the remaining portion of the propeller by hand revealed power train continuity. The inspector also noted that visual inspection of the engine revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction.