What happened
On April 28, 2015, a civilian Turbolet L-410 was conducting a flight from Kaunas (EYKA) to Rzeszów (EPRZ) at flight level 090. While traversing the Warsaw Flight Information Region (FIR EPWW), the aircraft entered the active TSA 02G segment of the TSA 02 training area at approximately 08:36 UTC.
Prior to the entry, the crew had correctly identified themselves to the FIS-Olsztyn frequency and were following their filed flight plan. However, during the period leading up to the incursion, air traffic management coordination was underway to clarify the status of the TSA 02G zone. While the zone had been activated in the Common Airspace Tool (CAT), the necessary updates to the radar displays were delayed. The boundary of the zone appeared as a dashed line on radar at 08:45:10 UTC, and the vertical limits were subsequently updated to F265/F095 at 08:45:45 UTC. The L-410 aircraft entered the restricted area before the airspace was properly reflected on the controllers' radar indicators.
The investigation
The investigation focused on the coordination between the Air Traffic Service (ATS) providers and the Air Traffic Management Center (AMC). The inquiry examined the sequence of radar updates and the communication between the FIS informant, the OAT coordinator, and the AMC. The investigation specifically looked into why the airspace boundaries were not immediately visible to controllers and why the aircraft's flight plan did not account for the active restriction.
Findings
- The Turbolet L-410 was operating in accordance with its filed flight plan, which did not include the TSA 02G restriction as listed in the Aeronautical Operational Plan (AUP) for that day.
- The ASM3 operator failed to draw and activate the TSA 02G zone on the radar displays prior to the aircraft's arrival, which resulted in the failure to generate an appropriate Airspace Precautionary Warning (APW).
- Errors in Air Traffic Management (ATM) procedures were the primary cause of the airspace infringement.
- No military flight operations were being conducted within the TSA 02G zone at the time of the incursion.
- The incident was not reported to the SUP ATM report system.
Safety action
Following the investigation, the findings were shared with AMC Poland to ensure ASM3 operators are aware of the findings and the necessity of reporting such incidents. Additionally, the report was provided to the Flight Training Center to be used as a case study for the training and refresher courses of air traffic controllers.