Introduction
On 26 June 2015, a Boeing 737-800 aircraft (type B738) operating a departure from Bydgoszcz Airport (EPBY) entered the active restricted airspace TSA08, located within FIR Warszawa. The incident involved multiple air traffic control (ATC) coordination failures.
Sequence of Events
The flight crew of the B738 was instructed by Bydgoszcz Tower (TWR) to avoid a weather area. The TWR controller issued a clearance to deviate around a cloud but did not consider that the active restricted zone TSA08C lay in the path and failed to inform the crew about the restriction. Additionally, the controller did not notify the relevant area control center (GAT ACC) of the changed departure conditions.
The crew established contact with GAT ACC at the moment separation with TSA08C was being lost. The GAT ACC controller delayed issuing a heading change away from the zone despite radar warnings indicating the proximity of the restricted area. Upon contact, the controller instructed the crew to turn left to exit the zone as quickly as possible and immediately reported the airspace violation to the OAT ACC sector.
Findings
- The TWR controller, who held ADI and APP ratings since 2012, authorized cloud avoidance without accounting for the active TSA08C.
- The GAT ACC controller, with ACP and ACS ratings since 2007 and 2008 respectively, hesitated to vector the aircraft away from the restricted zone despite radar alerts.
- Traffic volume was at the upper limit of acceptable levels, and the number of open sectors was appropriate.
- Both controllers had valid licenses, medical certificates, and recent refresher training.
Probable Cause
The incident was caused by errors in air traffic management (ATM). Specifically, the TWR controller failed to coordinate with the GAT ACC controller regarding the revised departure path and did not warn the crew of the active restricted area, while the GAT ACC controller delayed issuing corrective instructions despite radar warnings.
Safety Actions
The operator conducted an internal investigation and recommended sharing the final report with the relevant air traffic service units for awareness and training. No safety recommendations were issued by the investigation commission.