History of Flight
On May 12, 2018, about 0940 Alaska daylight time, a Piper Cherokee PA-28-180 airplane, N7061W, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Whittier, Alaska. The student pilot sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.
A family member stated that the pilot was repositioning his airplane from Merrill Field Airport (MRI), Anchorage, Alaska, to Valdez Pioneer Field Airport (VDZ), Valdez, Alaska, where he worked two weeks each month. The route comprised remote inland fjords, coastal waterways, and steep mountainous terrain, which required flight through Portage Pass. Portage Pass is a highly-traveled east-west pass between Turnagain Arm and Prince William Sound, about half a mile wide and bounded by a 4,660-foot peak to the north and a 6,100-foot peak to the south.
According to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic control records, the airplane departed MRI at 0859 and proceeded to the Turnagain Arm waterway, where the pilot reported his position at Bird Creek at 0916. No further radio communications were received. A review of data from a recovered Garmin Aera 500 device revealed that the pilot flew southeast along Turnagain Arm. About 0929, the last data point was recorded about five miles from the accident site and indicated the airplane at 1,352 feet mean sea level (msl) at 95 knots ground speed, heading approximately southeast.
According to the Alaska Rescue Coordination Center (AKRCC), an emergency locator transmitter (ELT) signal was received about 0940. The ELT was not registered to the airplane owner and there were no overdue airplane reports in Alaska. The AKRCC coordinated a ground and air search with the Civil Air Patrol; however, weather at the accident site prevented access. After a concerned family member reported the airplane overdue to the Kenai Flight Service Station, the FAA issued an alert notice (ALNOT) at 1516. The wreckage was located about 2100 on a steep, snow-covered mountain about 2,000 feet msl in Portage Pass.
Two pilots flying from Anchorage to Valdez around the accident time reported marginal weather conditions. One pilot reported barely making it through the highest part of the pass with 500 feet of ground clearance. When he reported his position on the area's common frequency, he heard an unidentified pilot say, "so the pass is finally open." The other transiting pilot decided not to fly low through the pass and found a clear area to climb above the weather and mountains.
Personnel Information
The pilot's flight logbook was not located. On his most recent medical certificate application, dated November 17, 2015, he reported 0 hours of flight experience. The pilot's brother estimated that the pilot had flown a few times before the accident since the snow melted. A flight instructor stated that the pilot had first soloed in 2017 with 17 hours of flight training and had soloed multiple times since. He also flew with the pilot on a cross-country flight on the same route about eight months before the accident. The instructor stated that, in his opinion, the pilot was not knowledgeable or experienced enough to fly the intended flight solo. The instructor had since moved away from Alaska and was not aware if the pilot had been flying with another instructor.
Meteorological Information
AIRMET Sierra was valid for the route of flight at the time of the accident for instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions and occasional mountain obscuration by clouds or precipitation. The Alaska Aviation Weather Unit published forecast graphical products indicating VFR conditions were forecast for Anchorage and Turnagain Arm, but marginal VFR conditions (ceiling 1,000 to 3,000 feet and/or visibility 3 to 5 statute miles) were forecast starting about Portage Pass east into the Gulf of Alaska. Archived images from FAA aviation weather cameras on the morning of the accident at Whittier and Portage Glacier between 0937 and 0941 depicted obscured mountain tops and visibility between 2 and 10 statute miles in the areas south and northeast of the accident site. A search of official weather briefing sources revealed that the accident pilot did not request a weather briefing through Flight Service or another access-controlled source. Whether the pilot accessed weather information before the flight could not be determined.
Wreckage and Impact Information
The wreckage was located about one mile south of Whittier Airport on the side of a mountain at the southeast end of Portage Passage. The NTSB did not access the wreckage due to hazardous steep snow-covered terrain. On-scene observations were performed by aerial survey and photographic evidence. A detailed examination was conducted after the wreckage was recovered.
The wreckage came to rest in deep snow on a 40° incline in a slightly nose-up, level attitude on a heading of 110°. Both wings exhibited significant leading-edge crush damage and were each rotated about 30° to the right around the airplane's vertical axis. All major components were located in the immediate vicinity of the main wreckage.
The fuselage exhibited extensive damage to the forward section and circumferential buckling aft of the baggage compartment. The cockpit floor was deformed upward with significant inward and upward buckling at the pilot station. The front left seat outboard lap belt connector was pulled out of the left fuselage mounting structure by the rivets on the lap belt connector. The rivets were "pull type" fasteners that did not comply with the solid rivets required by the manufacturer. Photographs revealed that the pilot's shoulder harness was not fastened to the lap belt.
Flight control cable continuity was confirmed from cockpit controls to the stabilator and rudder. The aileron cables were continuous from the control column chain to recovery separations aft of the main wing spar, except for an overload separation of the chain along the tee-bar. The manual flap handle was in the stowed position (flaps retracted). The flap cables were continuous from the handle to the torque tube.
The right wing main spar was fractured at the fuselage; the fracture surfaces exhibited a dull, grainy appearance consistent with overload separation. The empennage remained attached and intact, with minor buckling below the vertical stabilizer fairing and significant buckling deformation inboard of stabilator on the right side. The rudder was attached and intact with trailing edge impact damage. The stabilator was attached and rotated to the left around the vertical axis about 40°.
The wing fuel tanks were breached and no fuel was present at the time of examination. The fuel selector valve was between the right and left tank positions and the valve was functional. No fuel was observed in the airframe fuel lines. The fuel strainer bowl and screen were free of debris.
The propeller remained attached to the engine and indicated mild aft bending and some torsional twisting. Engine control continuity was established from the engine to cuts in the cables made during recovery.
A detailed examination of the engine established mechanical continuity throughout the engine, valve train, and accessory section. Thumb compression was obtained on all cylinders and a borescope examination revealed no pre-accident anomalies with the cylinder barrels, pistons, cylinder heads, or valves. The magnetos produced spark at the ignition leads when the crankshaft was manually rotated. No preaccident anomalies were noted with the airframe or engine that would have precluded normal operation.
Medical and Pathological Information
The Alaska State Medical Examiner's Office performed an autopsy of the pilot. The pilot's cause of death was blunt impacts of the head, trunk, and extremities. The FAA's Forensic Sciences Laboratory performed toxicology testing on the pilot's tissue samples, which identified Ranitidine in the urine and Cetirizine in the blood and urine. Ranitidine is a non-sedating stomach acid-reducing medication and is not considered impairing. Cetirizine is a potentially sedating allergy medicine.