History of Flight
On July 4, 2019, about 0153 eastern daylight time, an Agusta S.p.A. AW139 helicopter, registration N32CC, was substantially damaged when it crashed near Big Grand Cay, Abaco, Bahamas. The two pilots and five passengers on board sustained fatal injuries. The helicopter was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.
According to cellphone records, the owner of the helicopter called the pilot-in-command (PIC) about 2324 on July 3, requesting that the PIC fly his daughter and a friend from the Bahamas to the United States for medical treatment. The PIC then contacted a friend on the island, asking for lights to illuminate the private helipad. The PIC called the second-in-command (SIC) about 2343 to notify him of the flight. The SIC's wife reported that the SIC began checking weather and looking at landing sites.
Data from the combination cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder (FDR) showed the flight departed Palm Beach International Airport (PBI), West Palm Beach, Florida, about 0055 on July 4, destined for Big Grand Cay. The PIC was pilot flying from the right seat, and the SIC was pilot monitoring from the left seat. During the flight, the PIC commented on the darkness, and the SIC discussed dimming cockpit lights. The SIC stated he was night current and had done a lot of night flying, including off-airport landings. He warned against fixating on a single light and mentioned that a night landing in a "black hole" could be tricky.
The helicopter landed at the private helipad at Big Grand Cay about 0142. While on the ground with engines running, the PIC discussed flying to Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood International Airport (FLL) and the need for an ambulance. Three of the five passengers self-boarded; two were carried and strapped in. At 0145, the PIC filed an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan from Walker's Cay Airport (MYAW) to FLL, noting five people on board (though seven were actually on board) and sufficient fuel for 2 hours 16 minutes. The flight plan was not activated.
About 0150, the SIC discussed initial altitude and heading. At 0152:13, the SIC stated "our initial heading is going to be one eight zero." According to FDR data, the helicopter lifted off at 0152:17. The cyclic force trim release (FTR) switch was engaged for the entire flight. At 0152:31, about 62 ft above ground with no forward airspeed, the SIC said "alright airspeed coming up no it's not coming up so push that nose forward get some airspeed." The helicopter pitched nose-down and began climbing with increasing airspeed. At 0152:42, at 184 ft and 53 knots, the SIC said "watch your altitude." The helicopter then began to descend with a nose-down attitude, increasing airspeed, and a left turn. Enhanced ground proximity warning system (EGPWS) warnings began at 0152:48. The autopilot flight director engaged in altitude acquire (ALTA) and indicated airspeed (IAS) modes at 0152:50, but the helicopter continued descending. The collective FTR switch was activated, resetting the ALTA climb rate to +100 fpm. The helicopter pitched up, reaching a minimum altitude of 52 ft, then climbed with multiple EGPWS warnings. At 0152:56, the PIC asked "how high are you," and later stated "three hundred feet." The SIC replied that the helicopter had been "diving." The helicopter climbed to a maximum of 212 ft, then began descending again. At 0153:13, the SIC said "there was a fatal accident in the United Kingdom and this is exactly what happened there." The helicopter impacted the water about 0153:22 in a 7°-nose-down and 12°-left-bank attitude. No aural master cautions or warnings were recorded.
A witness about 1.6 nm southwest reported no moon visible and heard a "whoosh whoosh whoosh" sound as the helicopter descended, then heard impact. He searched but did not locate wreckage until later. At 1415, a company pilot was notified the helicopter had not arrived at FLL. The wreckage was found between 1600 and 1700. The PIC requested no air traffic services. The investigation was delegated from the Air Accident Investigation Department of the Bahamas to the NTSB on July 8.
Personnel Information
According to the chief pilot of Challenger Management LLC, the PIC was a friend of the owner and had operational control. The PIC logged flight time on an iPad, but damage precluded data access. Company flight logs did not record time of day or instrument conditions, so the PIC's night flight experience and instrument currency could not be determined. The PIC's girlfriend reported he did not like to fly at night and rarely did so. She said he told her the owner had been texting him all night, and he hoped he did not have to return. The PIC's 2017 airman certificate application indicated 42 hours of night instruction (3 in rotorcraft), 123 night takeoffs and landings (103 as PIC, 73 in rotorcraft), and 157 night hours as PIC (110 in rotorcraft).
The SIC's wife reported he had over 1,450 hours of night flying experience, with about 27 hours between November 21, 2018, and May 25, 2019. It could not be determined how many were in the accident helicopter type. The PIC and SIC had conducted 14 flights together in the accident helicopter, the last before the accident on February 22, 2019. Ten flights were to Big Grand Cay during the day. On all flights, the PIC was pilot flying and the SIC was pilot monitoring.
Both pilots received initial type rating training in the AW139 from August 28 to October 11, 2017, including 60 hours of ground and flight training with 8 hours VFR and 6 hours simulated IFR. They were trained in instrument takeoffs, unusual attitude recovery, and spatial disorientation recognition. The PIC received recurrent training in November 2018, receiving a below average overall evaluation. The SIC also received recurrent training then, with an overall average evaluation. Both passed Part 61 checkrides and proficiency checks on November 16, 2018.
During the 72 hours before the accident, the pilots were well rested. The PIC took a nap on July 3; the SIC took 2-3 hour naps each day. Cell phone activity showed breaks.
Aircraft Information
The helicopter's last flight log sheet documented two flights totaling 1.5 hours on July 3, both flown solo by the PIC. The helicopter was equipped with an integrated avionics system including an automatic flight control system (AFCS) controlling the flight director and four-axis autopilot. Force trim release (FTR) switches were on cyclic, collective, and pedals. When FTR was pressed, the pilot could override the autopilot. Releasing FTR re-engaged the autopilot with reset references. The altitude acquire (ALTA) mode could command a climb at default 1,000 fpm, modifiable via collective FTR or beep switch. If the collective FTR was used to descend while ALTA was engaged, the climb rate reset to a minimum of +100 fpm. A power index (PI) limiter prevented engine exceedances, limiting PI to 97% above 60 KIAS with both engines operating.
Data from the No. 2 engine data collection unit (DCU) recorded no events or faults during the 3.4 hours before the accident. The four actuator input/output modules (AIOPs) recorded no faults between takeoff and water impact.
Meteorological Information
ForeFlight records showed pilots obtained standard route briefings for the flight from MYAW to FLL at 0145. The National Composite Radar Mosaic at 0155 depicted an isolated echo south of the accident site; no other echoes along the route. No SIGMETs, Convective SIGMETs, Center Weather Advisories, or Airmen's Meteorological Information were current for the area between Florida and the Bahamas from 2200 to 0200. At the accident time, the sun and moon were more than 15° below the horizon, providing no illumination.
Wreckage and Recovery
A witness in a spotlight-equipped boat searched after hearing the impact but did not locate wreckage immediately. At 1415, a company pilot was notified the helicopter was overdue. He searched from FLL to Big Grand Cay without success. The witness later found the wreckage between 1600 and 1700.