Accident Details
On January 25, 2020, about 1535 eastern standard time, a Beech A36, N41VK, was substantially damaged during a rejected takeoff near Summerland Key, Florida. The private pilot was not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.
Pilot Account
The pilot reported that the airplane was equipped with a gust control lock to secure the flight controls, but he did not use it and kept it in a plastic tub secured behind the rear seats. He performed a preflight inspection that included a check of the elevator for freedom of movement. The airplane had a dual control yoke; a tablet computer mount was attached between the yokes, forward of the gust control lock installation location. As part of the run-up checklist, he verified full travel of the elevator and aileron controls. Although he normally flew with a tablet attached between the yokes, it was on the co-pilot's seat during the accident flight.
During takeoff, he taxied into position, applied full throttle while holding the brakes, then released the brakes and began the takeoff roll. While accelerating, he noticed the airplane nosing down and twice "bumped" the elevator trim towards nose-up. At 85 knots, he pulled aft on the control yoke but felt "resistance" from the elevator that he later reported did not feel right. He aborted the takeoff at 95 knots by reducing throttle and applying the brakes. Approaching the end of the runway with a canal ahead, he applied hard left rudder. The right wing clipped mangroves, and the airplane came to rest shortly thereafter. He stated that he did not attempt to access the plastic tub containing the gust control lock for at least 1 hour after the accident.
Airport Manager Observations
The airport manager arrived on scene within 3 to 5 minutes after the accident and found the pilot still in the airplane, seated in the right seat. He asked the pilot to clarify what he meant when he said he was unable to pull it off the ground, and the pilot replied, "I couldn't pull the yoke back; it must have been the control lock or something." At that point, the airport manager saw and photographed the airplane's gust control lock, an iPad, and a Stratus ADS-B receiver on the wingwalk of the right wing. According to the photograph metadata, it was taken at 1547, about 12 minutes after the estimated accident time. He reported that he did not see the plastic tub outside the airplane or in the cockpit, nor did he see the gust control lock inside the airplane.
Postaccident Examination
Postaccident examination by a Federal Aviation Administration inspector revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction of the elevator primary flight control system. A photograph of the left side view of the empennage with the gust control lock installed depicted the elevator in a trailing edge down position (airplane nose down).
A video taken during a segment of the takeoff roll showed the left side of the airplane. A review of a picture extracted from the video revealed the elevator primary flight control surface appeared to be in a trailing edge down position (airplane nose down).
Examination of the gust control lock assembly revealed a cover, part number 36-590013-5, was missing. The missing cover was designed to cover the throttle and mixture controls, preventing them from being moved with the control lock installed.
Service Bulletin
Service Bulletin (SB) 27-3459, originally issued in 2002 and revised in November 2016, applicable to the accident airplane, cited the need to disseminate safety information concerning the usage of unauthorized or altered gust locks on various Beech propeller airplanes. The SB indicated that compliance restored the airplane to the original type design but did not specify to inspect the gust control lock to assure it was complete. A review of the airframe maintenance records dating to 2001 revealed no entry indicating compliance with the SB, or replacement of the gust control lock.