On August 27, 2020, about 1353 Alaska daylight time, a Cessna 185 airplane, N714KH, was destroyed and a Piper PA-18 airplane, N7498L, was substantially damaged when they were involved in an accident near Fairbanks, Alaska. The pilot and one passenger on the Cessna 185 were fatally injured, and the other passenger sustained serious injuries. The pilot of the PA-18 also sustained serious injuries. The Cessna 185 was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 on-demand charter flight. The PA-18 was operated as a Title 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight. The Cessna 185, operated by Flying Moose Alaska, based at Chena Marina Airport (AK28), was transporting two hunters from a remote camp back to AK28. The PA-18 was departing AK28 for a flight to Bradley Sky-Ranch Airport (95Z), North Pole, Alaska, when the accident occurred. AK28 is an uncontrolled airport located about 3 miles west of Fairbanks International Airport (FAI), inside of the FAI class D airspace. All pilots arriving or departing from AK28 are required to contact the FAI air traffic control tower (ATCT) before entering the class D airspace to ensure they don’t conflict with FAI traffic. FAI air traffic control (ATC) tower recordings indicated that at 1344:24 the Cessna 185 pilot reported to FAI tower that he was 14 miles north of Fairbanks inbound to AK28. The tower controller responded, “proceed to chena marina advise down.” The airplane was not equipped with a transponder; however, primary ATC radar revealed that the Cessna 185 entered a left downwind for runway 36 and flew a left base to the final approach. The PA-18 pilot reported he performed his preflight, started the engine, and dialed in the FAI tower frequency to monitor air traffic control while the engine warmed up. He taxied to the north end of the airport where he fueled the airplane then taxied back to the south end of the airport in preparation for his takeoff to the north. The PA-18 pilot reported he monitored the FAI tower frequency as he taxied and did not recall hearing any traffic in the AK28 area nor did he see any traffic. He reported he pulled off the side of the runway, facing east, where he performed an engine runup and checked the automatic terminal information service. At 1352:19, while the Cessna 185 was turning from base to final approach, the pilot of the PA-18, transmitted his intentions to FAI tower for a north takeoff and southeast departure. The FAI tower controller responded, "report airborne off chena marina traffic on short final is a sky wagon." At 1352:30, the PA-18 pilot responded, “nine eight [unintelligible}.” In a postaccident interview, the PA-18 pilot did not recall the traffic advisory part of this transmission. The tower controller immediately advised the Cessna 185 "skylane four kilo hotel traffic departing chena marina super cub northbound." At 1352:38, the Cessna 185 pilot replied, "Yeah I'm right over him four kilo hotel." No further communications were received from either airplane. Figure 1 shows the flight track for the Cessna 185.

Figure 1. Accident site and approximate Cessna 185 flight track in blue.

During the postaccident interview, the PA-18 pilot reported that he visually looked to the north, the south, then back to the north before he taxied onto the runway. He recalled the tower controller communicating with another airplane and asking that pilot if he had an airplane in sight, to which the other pilot answered in the affirmative. The PA-18 pilot stated although his impression had been that the other airplane was not at AK28, the tower communication led him to check to the north and south again for traffic before taxiing onto the runway. The PA-18 pilot recalled taking off and reaching for the “mic button” to inform the FAI tower that he was airborne when he heard a “loud crack,” and the airplane began to slowly turn to the left while “falling out of the sky.” He did not know what happened but recalled being on the ground and another airplane crashing about 30 yards from his location. Multiple persons at AK28 heard the collision and assisted the occupants of both airplanes, including helping a passenger out of the Cessna 185 before it was consumed by fire. Airport Information AK28 is listed in the Alaska Chart Supplement as a private airport. A common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) of 118.3 MHz is listed. The additional remarks section states: Use at own risk. Both pilots were in contact with the FAI control tower on this frequency when the accident occurred.

In a letter of agreement, signed on March 23, 2000, between the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Fairbanks Airport traffic control tower and the Chena Marina Float Pond and Runway Association, outlines the operating procedures for the airport. Item D. states, in part: “Radio transmissions of pattern positions at Chena Marina are strongly discouraged unless requested by FAI tower.” Radar information was provided by the FAA and the source sensor is in Fairbanks, Alaska. Because the Cessna did not have an operational transponder, altitude information was not available. No flight track data was captured for the PA-18 as it likely never reached an altitude of radar coverage. Aircraft Information Neither airplane was equipped with automatic dependent surveillance broadcast, nor were they required to be. Pilot Information The PA-18 pilot reported that he normally wore hearing aids when not flying. When flying, he wore a noise cancelling headset without hearing aids or earplugs. Wreckage and Impact Information A home surveillance video located near midfield captured the moments immediately after the initial collision from about 70 ft above ground level. The Cessna 185 descended while rolling left and impacted the surface in a nose-down inverted attitude heading east, then slid north about 20 ft. The PA-18 simultaneously descended vertically in a flat attitude as its wings folded upward, coming to rest on a west heading. The debris field began about 255 ft south of the PA-18 and consisted primarily of PA-18 plexiglass and small parts. The Cessna 185 came to rest about 107 ft north of the PA-18 (see figure 2). According to responding witnesses, the Cessna became engulfed in flames soon after impact. Cessna 185 The fuselage was consumed by postimpact fire from the front of the horizontal stabilizer to the firewall. The empennage exhibited thermal damage. The left and right horizontal stabilizers and elevators remained attached at their respective attachment points. The vertical stabilizer and rudder were bent to the left with crush damage to the top of the vertical stabilizer and thermal damage to the bottom. The inboard section of both wings was destroyed by the postimpact fire. A 3-foot outboard section of the right wing and right aileron remained partially attached to the inboard section of the right wing. The outboard section of the left wing with a section of the aileron attached sustained thermal and leading edge impact damage. All non-consumed portions of the flight controls remained attached to their respective attach points. All flight control cables were connected to their respective flight control surfaces. The engine sustained thermal damage. Two of the propeller blades exhibited ‘S’ bending and leading edge gouges. The third blade was bent aft 90° near the outboard end of the blade and about 5-inches of the blade tip had separated. No preimpact failures/malfunctions of the airplane were identified during the examination. PA-18 The left and right horizontal stabilizer, elevators, vertical stabilizer, and rudder sustained impact damage. Control continuity was established from the control surfaces to the cockpit controls. Both wings were separated from the fuselage and both wings had propeller slash marks near their wing root and aluminum fuel tank cover. The right wing root area contained eight propeller slash marks and the left wing root area contained five propeller slash marks. The propeller slashes indicate an angle of about 10° relative to the longitudinal axis of the airplane. The ailerons and flaps remained attached to their respective wings. Aileron control continuity was established for both the left and right wing ailerons. The pilots shoulder harness separated near its upper attach point and exhibited features consistent with having been cut by the propeller.

Figure 2. Both wreckage and debris locations. Additional Information Title 14 CFR 91.113 Right-of-way rules: Except water operations states, in part: (b) General. When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation is conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and avoid other aircraft. When a rule of this section gives another aircraft the right-of-way, the pilot shall give way to that aircraft and may not pass over, under, or ahead of it unless well clear. (g) Aircraft, while on final approach to land or while landing, have the right-of-way over other aircraft in flight or operating on the surface, except that they shall not take advantage of this rule to force an aircraft off the runway surface which has already landed and is attempting to make way for an aircraft on final approach. The FAA Pilot’s Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge, Chapter 14, Airport Operations, addresses communications at nontowered airports. This chapter states, in part: A nontowered airport does not have an operating control tower. Two-way radio communications are not required, although it is a good operating practice for pilots to transmit their intentions on the specified frequency for the benefit of other traffic in the area. The key to communicating at an airport without an operating control tower is selection of the correct common frequency. The acronym CTAF, which stands for Common Traffic Advisory Frequency, is synonymous with this program. A CTAF is a frequency designated for the purpose of carrying out airport advisory practices while operating to or from an airport without an operating control tower. The CTAF may be a Universal Integrated Community (UNICOM), MULTICOM, Flight Service Station (FSS), or tower frequency and is identified in appropriate aeronautical publications. The Recommended Communication Procedures chart, Figure 14-1, in the handbook shows that without an operating control tower at the airport, it is recommended that inbound aircraft announce their position when 10 miles out from the airport, when entering downwind, base and final, and again when leaving the runway. FAA Order JO 7110.65Z Air Traffic Control, Pilot/Controller glossary states, in part: Note 2: Traffic advisory service will be provided to the extent possible depending on higher priority duties of the controller or other limitations; e.g., radar limitations, volume of traffic, frequency congestion, or controller workload. Radar/nonradar traffic advisories do not relieve the pilot of his/her responsibility to see and avoid other aircraft. Pilots are cautioned that there are many times when the controller is not able to give traffic advisories concerning all traffic in the aircraft’s proximity; in other words, when a pilot requests or is receiving traffic advisories, he/she should not assume that all traffic will be issued.