Accident Overview
On December 10, 2020, at approximately 1547 mountain standard time, a Cirrus Design Corp. SR22, registration N577CP, was substantially damaged during a landing at Ogden Hinkley Airport (OGD), Ogden, Utah. The pilot was seriously injured. The flight was conducted under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight.
Sequence of Events
According to the pilot, the engine ran smoothly during takeoff on runway 17, and the airplane became airborne in the usual spot. During initial climb, he noticed a loss of power that prevented continued climb. He lowered the nose to maintain airspeed and initiated a right turn to land on runway 3. After landing, he applied maximum braking but the airplane did not stop, exiting the right side of the runway and coming to rest upright beyond the departure end.
The pilot attempted to activate the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) by pulling the handle, but it did not activate. He used his right hand while flying with his left and could not recall the force applied. He stated that he knew the parachute would not provide normal sway but hoped for drag.
Flight Data Recorder Analysis
Data from the onboard avionics showed engine power increasing around 1545:07, with left and right turbine inlet temperatures differentiating. Manifold pressure rose to 34.8 inches of mercury and rpm to 2,652.3, then decreased to 25.55 inches and 2,478.2 rpm. The airplane established a positive climb rate at 1545:37 and entered a right turn 12 seconds later. Maximum GPS altitude was 4,695 feet mean sea level, with descent beginning at 1546:35. The airplane aligned with runway 3 and touched down about 2,423 feet from the departure end at a groundspeed of 121.84 knots. Engine rpm remained around 2,600 with manifold pressure at about 25 inches until 18 seconds before touchdown.
Crew Alert System and Parachute System
The avionics included a Crew Alert System (CAS) that would display a "manifold pressure" warning and sound an audible double chime when manifold pressure exceeded 34 inches. Data indicated the warning criteria were met about 10 seconds before takeoff. The pilot did not recall any audible chimes or tones.
The CAPS handle was found out of its holder, with the mounting bracket bent downward 90 degrees. The system was not activated, and the activation switch was not triggered. Subsequent testing with the rocket removed showed activation cable continuity to the igniter switch and operational igniter circuit continuity. No preexisting malfunction that would prevent normal CAPS operation was found. The Pilot Operating Handbook states that pulling the activation handle requires a strong, steady, continuous force of 45 pounds or more to activate the rocket.
Post-Accident Examination
Engine examination revealed that the sensing line from the left intercooler to the pressure controller was hand tight at the control unit. The No. 1 cylinder spark plug and No. 4 cylinder ignition lead were also hand tight. The right-side turbocharger shaft nut was found in the turbine inlet, with significant damage to the turbine inlet housing. Induction system examination showed one induction tube and clamp crushed consistent with impact, while the rest were intact.
Review of maintenance logbooks showed that the most recent annual inspection was completed two days before the accident. The entry indicated compliance with the Tornado Alley Turbocharger System Inspection for continued airworthiness. The Tornado Alley Turbo, Inc. continued airworthiness manual states that "manifold pressure is high and stays high after engine is warm" when the absolute pressure control sensing line is broken or loose. A company representative reported that pressure outside the induction tubes is about 5 inches lower than inside, and if coupling clamps are not secure, an air leak can occur at the coupling.