Accident Details
On March 16, 2024, at approximately 1530 eastern daylight time, a Cirrus SR22, registration N469GB, sustained substantial damage during an accident near Reidsville, Georgia. The private pilot and one passenger were not injured. The flight was conducted under Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight.
Flight History
The pilot reported departing St. Simons Island Airport (SSI), St. Simons Island, Georgia, with an intended destination of W H 'Bud' Barron Airport (DBN), Dublin, Georgia, his home airport. During takeoff, climb, and initial cruise, all engine parameters and airplane performance were normal. About 30 minutes into the flight, without warning, the engine emitted a loud noise and lost power, immediately followed by oil spraying onto the windscreen. The pilot established best glide speed, declared an emergency, and turned left toward a diversion airport approximately 10 nm away. He realized the airplane would not reach it.
Descent and Parachute Deployment
As the airplane descended through 4,500 ft mean sea level (msl), the pilot observed no suitable landing area; the terrain was hilly and covered with pine trees. When the airplane descended through 2,500 ft msl, he deployed the whole airframe parachute system. The parachute arrested the descent immediately above the pine trees, and the airplane settled between several trees in a nose-low attitude, held upright by parachute lines and canopy caught in the trees. The pilot and passenger egressed without injury.
Postaccident Examination
Examination revealed a fractured engine crankcase. The No. 4 cylinder was damaged and peeled back from the No. 4 connecting rod. The engine crankshaft could not be rotated. The oil pump showed light scratches; the oil filter contained numerous particles of ferrous and nonferrous material. The induction system and plenum were damaged consistent with contact from the No. 4 connecting rod. The remaining engine components exhibited normal operating signatures. A hole was found on top of the crankcase between cylinder Nos. 3 and 4.
Disassembly showed the No. 4 connecting rod was fractured at the piston pin connection, with only fragments present. The No. 4 connecting rod bushings were found in the oil sump. Examination of remaining bushings revealed breakage, chipping, and dislocation on all other connecting rods.
Service Bulletin and Maintenance History
The engine manufacturer had issued Critical Service Bulletin (CSB) CSB07-01A, titled "Connecting Rod Piston Pin Bushing Inspection," to address issues with the bushings. The bulletin provided inspection instructions due to reports of piston pin bushing material found in the oil sump or oil filter. It outlined procedures to strain engine oil and inspect oil filter media during oil changes to detect separated bushing material. If issues were suspected, it included steps to remove cylinders and pistons for visual inspection.
The airplane owner had engine oil changes approximately every 20 to 30 hours and participated in an oil analysis (OA) program. The previous six OA reports indicated trace amounts attributed to normal wear. However, during the most recent OA conducted on February 16, 2024, about 15 hours before the accident flight, the maintaining mechanic informed the OA laboratory that small amounts of metal were seen in the oil filter.
The mechanic stated he did not follow the critical service bulletin because he assumed he was going above and beyond the procedures. He changed engine oil every 30 hours or less, cut open the filter, and examined the pleats for metal. He sent oil for analysis and received detailed reports. During the most recent oil change, he discovered trace material and advised the laboratory. He noted that the last year of reports showed no red flags and that he was in communication with the lab. There was nothing to indicate a potential issue with the engine.
At the time of the accident, the engine had accrued 1,507 total hours since new.