What happened
On the night of January 21, 2010, an AgustaWestland AW139 helicopter, registration EC-KYR, crashed into the sea approximately 4.5 nautical miles south of Almeria Airport. The aircraft, operated by INAER HELICÓPTEROS OFF-SHORE, was conducting a scheduled nighttime search and rescue (SAR) training mission.
The flight had been underway for over two hours, performing various SAR exercises. At approximately 20:13 local time, the crew began the return transit to the base. Shortly thereafter, at 20:16, the helicopter impacted the water at a ground speed of 110 knots. The impact occurred in 91 meters of water, and the aircraft subsequently sank. Of the four crew members on board, the pilot, copilot, and rescue swimmer were killed, while the winch operator survived with serious injuries.
The investigation
The CIAIAC investigation focused on the flight parameters during the final descent and the crew's performance during the transition from training maneuvers to the return flight. Investigators examined the flight data recorder, cockpit voice recorder, and the aircraft's maintenance and configuration records. The probe also looked into the regulatory environment for SAR operations in Spain, the operator's training programs, and the adequacy of the checklists used during the mission.
Findings
Investigation established that the accident was a controlled flight into water caused by the pilot's misjudgment of the aircraft's altitude. This error was attributed to a visual illusion from using external references, a faulty interpretation of instruments, or a combination of both. Additionally, the copilot failed to properly monitor flight parameters.
Several contributing factors were identified:
- Crew Fatigue and Workload: The captain experienced excessive workload by performing many of the copilot's duties, while the copilot faced high cognitive demands due to inexperience with SAR operations and language barriers.
- Training Deficiencies: A lack of specialized SAR and Crew Resource Management (CRM) training prevented the crew from managing fatigue, handling the transition between flight phases, and effectively communicating during critical maneuvers.
- Warning Habituation: The crew had become habituated to the 'LANDING GEAR' and 'ONE FIFTY FEET' audio warnings, rendering them ineffective during the final moments of flight.
- Operational Procedures: The use of SAR checklists that were not adapted to the specific aircraft model and the disengagement of the Flight Director contributed to the loss of situational awareness.
- Regulatory Gaps: A lack of specific Spanish regulations for SAR operations and insufficient oversight by the service provider were noted.