What happened
On January 21, 2016, a Cessna 525A, registration PR-ARS, was performing a private passenger flight from Aeródromo Comandante Rolim Adolfo Amaro (SBJD) in Jundiaí, Brazil, bound for Palmas, Tocantins. The aircraft was carrying two pilots and four passengers.
During the takeoff roll from runway 18, the aircraft reached rotation speed. However, during the ground roll, an attempt was made to abort the takeoff. The pilot in the right seat, who was not qualified or experienced in this aircraft type, moved the throttles to the idle position without any verbal command. The pilot in command (PIC) applied both normal and emergency braking. Due to the timing of the abort and the aircraft's performance parameters, the aircraft failed to stop within the runway limits, resulting in a runway excursion (overrun) past the end of runway 36. The aircraft sustained substantial damage, but all six occupants escaped without injury.
The investigation
CENIPA investigators examined the flight data, cockpit voice recorder (CVR) audio, and aircraft performance requirements. The investigation established that the aircraft was operating with a weight of 12,675 lb, which was 175 lb above the manufacturer's maximum takeoff weight.
Furthermore, the investigation found that the crew had used simplified takeoff performance criteria that were not applicable to the specific conditions at the airfield. While the aircraft was capable of single-pilot operation, the crew included a second pilot who lacked the necessary type rating and experience for the C525A. The investigation also noted that the takeoff roll from runway 18 involved a 2% uphill gradient, and the required runway length for the actual weight and conditions exceeded the available 4,593 feet of pavement. The CVR revealed a lack of standardized checklists and callouts, with the crew engaging in informal communication.
Findings
- The aircraft was operating above the maximum takeoff weight permitted by the manufacturer.
- The takeoff performance calculations were performed by the unqualified pilot and were not verified by the pilot in command.
- The takeoff performance simplified criteria were used despite the runway gradient, obstacle presence, and runway length not meeting the required safety thresholds.
- The decision to abort the takeoff occurred after the decision speed (V1) had been reached.
- There was a lack of coordination and standardized communication between the two pilots during the takeoff phase.
- The takeoff roll was conducted on an uphill gradient that increased the required runway distance beyond the available length.