What happened
On September 30, 2011, at 13:33 local time, two Bell 212 helicopters, registrations EC-GIC and CC-US, collided in mid-air while performing firefighting duties near Bienservida, Albacete. Both aircraft were operated by INAER and were engaged in water replenishment at the Balsa de Gómez, a reservoir located approximately 2 km northeast of the village.
The incident occurred during an active wildfire response. The aircraft EC-GIC (H02) was performing its fourth water refill, while CC-US (H13) was on its third. At the moment of impact, both helicopters were hovering or moving at near-zero translational speed over the reservoir. The collision caused both aircraft to fall into the water. The pilot of EC-GIC managed to exit the cabin and survived with burns to the face and hands, while the pilot of CC-US sustained fatal injuries due to blunt force trauma and drowning.
The investigation
The CIAIAC investigation examined the coordination of aerial resources, communication protocols, and the operational environment. The investigation established that a third helicopter, EC-GXA, was also active in the area but was not involved in the collision.
Investigators found that an Air Coordination Aircraft (ACO) had been mobilized but had not yet arrived at the scene when the collision occurred; the ACO arrived 24 minutes after the accident. The investigation also looked into the flight paths, noting that the pilot of EC-GIC was performing a right-hand turn to establish a southbound approach, which reduced visibility of the reservoir during the maneuver. Furthermore, the investigation reviewed the training and procedures of the ground-based environmental agents responsible for directing the firefighting efforts in the absence of the ACO.
Findings
- The primary cause of the collision was the lack of coordination between the three aerial resources participating in the fire suppression, which allowed two aircraft to occupy the same space at the reservoir simultaneously.
- There was no established procedure for coordinating aerial assets in the absence of an ACO.
- The operator lacked a defined flight pattern (carousel) or notification system for aircraft entering or exiting the water replenishment zone.
- Communications between the pilots were extremely limited, with no specific notifications regarding arrival or departure from the reservoir.
- Ground-based personnel lacked the necessary training to effectively coordinate aerial assets when the ACO was not present.
- The timing of the ACO activation often leaves a window of time where multiple aircraft are operating without centralized coordination.
- The pilot of CC-US was not wearing a helmet and was not properly secured with shoulder harnesses, which contributed to the severity of the injuries.