What happened
On 12 October 2000, a Piper Comanche departed the Rendell Creek airstrip, located approximately 30 nautical miles southeast of Kelowna, British Columbia, for a local sightseeing flight. The aircraft was operated by a pilot with approximately 500 total flight hours, accompanied by three passengers.
As the aircraft reached the end of the 1,750-foot gravel and grass runway, it became airborne at a low altitude of roughly 20 feet. The aircraft maintained a significant nose-up attitude before the pilot applied full up-stabilator and reduced engine power just before impact. The aircraft struck the ground heavily, sliding through trees and hitting stumps 450 feet beyond the runway terminus. The impact caused severe structural damage to the fuselage. The accident resulted in two fatalities and two serious injuries, with one injured passenger later passing away in the hospital.
The investigation
Investigators examined the aircraft, the pilot's records, and the environmental conditions. The engine, propeller, airframe, and flight controls showed no mechanical defects or pre-existing anomalies; all damage was attributed to the impact forces. The weather was found to be suitable for visual flight rules, with light winds and good visibility.
Technical analysis of the aircraft's performance indicated that with the flaps retracted, the Piper Comanche would have required more than 2,500 feet of runway to become airborne under the prevailing conditions—at least 750 feet more than the available runway length. In contrast, using 18 degrees of flaps would have required approximately 1,200 feet, plus an additional 20 percent for the grass surface.
Review of the pilot's procedures revealed that he had recently adopted a habit of taxiing with the flaps retracted to avoid stone damage to the flaps, intending to extend them only after turning the aircraft around. Furthermore, the pilot utilized a custom, laminated checklist that differed significantly from the official FAA-approved flight manual. This personal checklist lacked instructions to verify flap settings during the take-off phase.
Findings
- The pilot attempted a takeoff with the flaps in the retracted position on a runway that was insufficient for that configuration.
- The pilot's custom checklist failed to include a requirement to check or review the flap setting before the takeoff roll.
- The use of shoulder harnesses, which were not installed in this 1960 model, likely would have reduced the severity of the injuries sustained by the occupants.