What happened
On March 13, 2001, at 0450 Newfoundland standard time, a Piper PA-30 Twin Comanche, registration N8736Y, departed Runway 16 at St. John's International Airport for a transatlantic ferry flight to the Azores. The aircraft was operated by a single pilot. Shortly after takeoff, radar tracked the aircraft climbing to 900 feet, at which point its speed began to decrease. The aircraft then experienced a sudden climb rate of 1200 feet per minute before descending vertically at 2200 feet. The aircraft impacted a residential area near Quidi Vidi Lake, breaking into three sections. The pilot sustained fatal injuries.
The investigation
The investigation examined the aircraft's configuration, weight, and center of gravity (CG). The aircraft was equipped with a ferry fuel system consisting of two 4/5-gallon drums mounted in the cabin. Investigators found the aircraft was at least 425 pounds over its maximum allowable takeoff weight of 3800 pounds. Furthermore, the center of gravity was approximately three inches beyond the aft limit.
Evidence showed that while the pilot had been aware of CG limitations during previous flight legs, the aircraft was refueled to capacity in St. John's, pushing the CG out of limits. The investigation also noted that the aircraft carried significant unnecessary cargo, including paint tins, engine parts, and unrestrained passenger seats placed atop the ferry tanks. The pilot had not submitted the required documentation for the ferry flight modifications to Transport Canada, nor had a maintenance release been completed for the fuel system installation.
Findings
- The aircraft was operating at more than 11% above its maximum allowable gross takeoff weight.
- The center of gravity was three inches beyond the aft limit, which reduced forward control authority and hindered recovery from a nose-high attitude.
- Unsecured cargo was stowed on top of the ferry tanks, and grocery bags were hung from the control yoke, which may have impeded movement.
- The pilot operated the aircraft without the necessary regulatory approvals or submitted documentation for the modified fuel system.
- There was no evidence of mechanical failure, icing, or pilot incapacitation; the engines were fully functional at impact.