What happened
On a scheduled flight from Grande Prairie, Alberta, to Fort St. John, British Columbia, a Peace Air Ltd. British Aerospace Jetstream 3112, registration C-FBIP, attempted an instrument landing in deteriorating weather. During the second approach to Runway 29, the aircraft was flying at 130 knots with a 20° flap setting. As the aircraft descended to approximately 300 feet above ground level, the captain requested a change to the full 35° flap setting.
This configuration change caused the aircraft to pitch up and destabilize. While the first officer focused on updating the reference cards for the new landing speed, the aircraft's descent rate increased significantly. The aircraft touched down 320 feet short of the runway threshold in packed snow, striking the approach and runway threshold lights. The impact caused the right main landing gear to break and the nose gear to collapse. The aircraft slid along the runway, coming to rest 380 feet beyond the threshold. There were no injuries to the two pilots or the 10 passengers on board.
The investigation
The investigation examined the flight crew's performance, company procedures, and the environmental conditions at the time of the accident. Investigators found that the weather at Fort St. London was experiencing heavy blowing snow and high winds, with visibility fluctuating significantly.
Technical analysis of the cockpit voice recorder revealed that the aircraft's recording system was not meeting regulatory standards, as the first officer's microphone channel was not functioning correctly. Furthermore, the investigation looked into the crew's use of approach charts and their adherence to standard operating procedures regarding altitude and speed monitoring during the final stages of the approach.
Findings
- A late full flap selection at 300 feet above ground level destabilized the aircraft's pitch, speed, and descent rate during the most critical phase of the approach.
- Both pilots stopped monitoring the flight instruments once the approach lights became visible, which prevented them from noticing a significant deviation below the glide slope.
- The crew used an incorrect, rounded-down decision height and failed to apply necessary cold temperature corrections, increasing the risk of an undershoot.
- The lack of a pilot monitoring procedure (PMA) meant there was no dedicated person to monitor instruments while the captain focused on visual references.
- The first officer's lack of experience with instrument approaches in these specific conditions may have impacted decision-making.