What happened
On November 26, 2020, a cargo flight operating an Airbus A300 B4-622R was performing a takeoff from runway 25R at Brussels Airport. During the rotation phase, the captain noticed that the aircraft failed to lift off as expected. Although the aircraft had already surpassed V1 speed, the pilot initiated an aborted takeoff. During the high-speed deceleration, the crew experienced airframe vibrations and suspected an engine surge, though no technical anomalies were found in the engines. The aircraft came to a stop approximately 624 meters from the end of the runway. The intense heat generated by the braking process caused the temperature of the wheels to reach 700 °C, resulting in all main landing gear tyres bursting.
The investigation
AAIU(Be) investigators examined the aircraft's maintenance history and flight data. It was discovered that during maintenance performed the previous night to address a configuration warning, the pitch trim wheel had been moved from a nose-up position to a nose-down position (1.1 degrees). The investigation also reviewed the crew's 'AFTER START' checklist, which was intended to verify the trim setting. Flight data and simulator reconstructions confirmed that while the takeoff was physically possible, the incorrect trim setting made the control column significantly harder to move, creating the sensation that the aircraft would not rotate.
Findings
- The decision to reject the takeoff after passing V1 speed was an incorrect action selection.
- The primary cause of the difficult rotation was an inadequate pitch trim setting.
- Maintenance personnel failed to return the trim wheel to a neutral position following operational tests.
- The crew misidentified the trim position during the pre-flight checklist due to a combination of misreading the wheel and an expectation that the trim was correctly set to nose-up.
- No mechanical failures were found in the engines or the flight control systems.
Safety action
Following the incident, the operator implemented several safety improvements:
- The 'AFTER START' checklist was updated to require a dual-pilot crosscheck of the pitch trim setting.
- A safety alert was distributed to remind flight crews of the importance of verifying correct trim positions.
- All pilots operating the A300 fleet underwent recurrent simulator training specifically addressing incorrect trim settings.