What happened
On 16 July 2003, a Boeing 737-86N, registration G-XLAG, was preparing for a charter flight from Manchester Airport to Kos, Greece. The aircraft was carrying 190 passengers and seven crew members. During the pre-flight phase, the co-pilot calculated the required fuel load but did not review the relevant NOTAMs for Manchester Airport, while the commander deferred his review of the NOTAMs until arriving at the aircraft.
During the takeoff roll on Runway 06L, the flight crew was unaware that the runway was operating at a reduced length due to ongoing rubber deposit removal works. Because of a misunderstanding regarding instructions between Air Traffic Control and the crew, the aircraft entered the runway from holding point AG instead of the expected point A. Consequently, the takeoff was performed using a reduced thrust setting based on the assumption of a full-length runway.
As the aircraft accelerated past the crest of the runway, the crew spotted several vehicles at the far end of the pavement. By this stage, the aircraft was approaching its rotation speed, making an aborted takeoff impossible within the remaining usable distance. The aircraft continued the takeoff, passing within 56 feet of a 14-foot-high vehicle.
The investigation
The AAIB investigation examined the communication between Air Traffic Control (ATC) and the flight crew, as well as the management of the runway maintenance by Manchester Airport plc and NATS. The investigation revealed that the crew had access to information regarding the work-in-progress via the ATIS broadcast and a NOTAM, but this information was not effectively utilized.
Furthermore, the investigation looked into the planning of the rubber removal operation. It was discovered that previous incidents had occurred during this period of work, including a night prior to the event where three commercial aircraft were instructed to go-around after being positioned to land on the shortened runway.
Findings
- The crew of G-XLAG did not realize Runway 06L was operating at a reduced length until the aircraft reached a speed near rotation.
- The flight crew failed to identify the reduced runway length despite the availability of a NOTAM and ATIS information.
- A difference in interpretation of information between ATC and the crew led to the aircraft using an incorrect entry point (AG instead of A).
- The aircraft was at a speed and position that precluded an aborted takeoff once the vehicles were sighted.