What happened
On 22 January 2004, a 36-year-old instructor was conducting a training flight in Valle de Bravo, Mexico. While approaching the landing area after several hours of flight, the pilot initiated a spiral maneuver to manage excess altitude. During this continuous turn, the pilot increased the bank angle, which significantly increased the load factor on the equipment. Shortly after, the lines on one side of the Gin Boomerang III snapped, causing the canopy to collapse.
In an attempt to save himself, the pilot deployed his emergency parachute. However, the parachute failed to deploy properly; instead, it became detached from the harness. The pilot fell approximately 100 meters into a lake, resulting in 1 fatality.
The investigation
The Swedish Accident Investigation Board (SHK) examined the wreckage, which included the paraglider, harness, and emergency parachute. Testing of the paraglider's lines revealed that the aircraft was equipped with competition-grade aramid lines. These lines, which lack protective sheathing, were found to be significantly weaker than the manufacturer's specifications. Laboratory tests showed that the breaking strength of the lines had decreased considerably from their original values.
Investigators also examined the harness and the attachment mechanism for the emergency parachute. The investigation focused on the structural integrity of the lines under high load factors and the security of the connection between the pilot's harness and the reserve chute.
Findings
- The primary cause of the accident was that the emergency parachute was inadequately connected to the harness, causing it to come loose during deployment.
- A major contributing factor was the breakage of the paraglider lines due to overloading during the spiral maneuver.
- The use of competition-type lines contributed to the failure, as these lines are thinner, more vulnerable to wear, and were found to have reduced strength after use.
- The paraglider was not tested or approved for use in its specific configuration with these competition lines.
- The harness itself was not an approved model, and the connection point for the reserve parachute was structurally insufficient for the forces encountered.
Safety action
To prevent similar occurrences, the investigation recommended that aviation authorities ensure paragliders, harnesses, and emergency parachutes are inspected and maintained according to established intervals. The report also suggested the introduction of maintenance logbooks for all components and called for further research into the structural loads experienced by paragliders during advanced flight maneuvers.