What happened
On 8 February 2021, an Embraer EMB-500 (registration 9H-FAM) operated by Luxwing was performing a commercial passenger flight from Venice, Italy, to Paris-Le Bourget. During the approach to runway 27, the crew encountered icing conditions. While the crew had activated the wing and stabilizer de-ice system earlier in the descent, they deactivated it after visually observing ice breaking up from the leading edges.
As the aircraft approached the runway, it was flying at speeds consistent with non-icing conditions. Shortly before reaching the decision height, the aircraft' 50 ft altitude, the airspeed dropped and the angle of attack increased sharply. The aircraft entered a stall, triggering the "STALL STALL" warning. The aircraft touched down hard on the runway, causing the right landing gear to fail and penetrate the wing fuel tank. This led to a fire and a subsequent runway excursion. All three occupants—the captain, co-pilot, and one passenger—evacuated the destroyed aircraft without injury.
The investigation
The BEA examined flight data from the FDR and CVR, wreckage distribution, and airport surveillance footage. The investigation focused on the aircraft's aerodynamic performance in icing conditions and the crew's decision-making regarding the de-ice system. Investigators also reviewed the aircraft's Stall Warning Protection System (SWPS) and the manufacturer's performance limitations. The investigation noted that the aircraft was not equipped with an ice detector, which could have provided more objective information regarding ice accretion.
Findings
- The primary cause was the accumulation of ice on the wings and horizontal stabilizer, which occurred after the crew deactivated the de-ice system.
- The crew selected landing speeds (VRef 97 kt) appropriate for non-icing conditions, which were significantly lower than the required speeds for icing conditions (118.7 kt).
- The aircraft's landing performance in icing conditions was incompatible with the available runway length at Le Bourget, creating a conflict between following manufacturer procedures and avoiding a diversion.
- A deviation from standard procedures—deactivating de-ice systems based solely on visual inspection of the wing leading edges—was identified as a practice common among the Phenom 100 pilot community.
- The deactivation of the de-ice system meant the SWPS was not configured to provide appropriate warnings or protection for the actual icing conditions present.