What happened
On November 14, 2017, a Le Mans FK14 Polaris (registration 57BMY), operated by Hibiscus, was conducting a commercial tourist flight near Voh, New Caledonia. The flight was part of a formation involving three ultralight motor aircraft (ULMs) flying over the Trou Bleu d’Oundjo.
At approximately 6:30 AM, the pilot of the 57BMY announced the start of "exercises" to the other aircraft in the formation. Following three successful maneuvers, the pilot began a fourth turn. During this maneuver, the aircraft experienced a sudden loss of control, entering a dynamic spin that resulted in a high-rate rotation before impacting the water in the lagoon. The accident resulted in two fatalities (the pilot and one passenger) and the destruction of the aircraft.
The investigation
The BEA investigation utilized data from the aircraft's Skyview Dynon D700 and D1000 electronic flight information systems, video footage from a nearby Alpha Trainer, and witness testimonies.
Investigators examined the operational practices of the operator, noting that while the company had an operations manual, the specific maneuvers performed—described by the company as "lazy eights"—actually constituted unauthorized aerobatic maneuvers. The investigation also scrutinized the pilot's work schedule, finding that the pilot had been working intense hours, often exceeding the legal limits set by New Caledonian labor laws, leading to significant fatigue. Furthermore, the investigation analyzed the aircraft's ballistic parachute, which was found deployed but had not been manually activated by the crew; the deployment was likely caused by the structural deformation of the airframe upon impact.
Findings
- The primary cause of the accident was a loss of control during an unauthorized aerobatic maneuver, specifically an asymmetric stall during a high-bank, high-load climbing turn.
- The pilot lacked the specific training required to recognize and recover from the resulting spin.
- The pilot was suffering from significant fatigue due to an intense flight schedule and a lack of sufficient rest periods.
- The practice of performing maneuvers that exceeded the aircraft's standard flight envelope had become normalized within the company, reducing risk awareness.
- The aircraft's flight manual explicitly prohibited spins and maneuvers with bank angles exceeding 60 degrees.