What happened
On April 6, 2017, a B&F Technik FK1s Polaris microlight, registration OO-E72, was operating as part of a five-aircraft formation flying from Bellegarde Vouvray to the Megève altiport. The aircraft was following another microlight on the final approach for runway 15.
As the aircraft approached the runway threshold, the pilot initiated a go-around. During the maneuver, the pilot executed a right-hand turn. During this turn, the aircraft entered a stall and entered a steep dive, striking the treetops approximately 40 meters from the edge of the runway. The aircraft crashed roughly 150 meters from the threshold and 70 meters to the right of the runway centerline, where it caught fire. The pilot and the passenger both sustained fatal injuries.
The investigation
Investigators examined the wreckage and the site, noting that the aircraft struck trees approximately 20 meters in height before impacting the ground. The impact caused a fire that destroyed the entire airframe. The wreckage showed evidence of a heavy nose-down attitude at the moment of impact. While the rudder control remained intact, the continuity of the aileron and elevator controls could not be verified due to fire damage. The flaps were found in position 2.
Video footage from two other aircraft in the formation, OO-H39 and D-MILP, allowed investigators to reconstruct the timeline. The footage confirmed that the pilot of OO-E72 initiated the go-around near the runway threshold and began the right turn approximately 45 seconds after the lead aircraft had touched down.
Investigators also reviewed the pilot's experience, noting that while the pilot held a valid multi-axis microlight license, he had approximately 400 flight hours and lacked specific experience operating at altiports or mountain surfaces. The investigation also reviewed the flight briefing provided by the lead pilot, which focused on horizontal spacing between aircraft but did not address specific mountain landing procedures.
Findings
- The decision to perform a go-around on short final at an altiport led to an excessive pitch-up attitude and subsequent loss of control during the turn.
- The pilot's lack of experience with mountain flying and altiport operations likely contributed to the improper decision-making during the approach.
- The flight briefing provided by the formation leader was insufficient for the specific requirements of an altiport, as it only addressed horizontal spacing and did not account for the risks of go-arounds on sloped runways.
- The aircraft was in a flap configuration (position 2) that did not match the recommended takeoff or climb configuration for a go-around, which typically requires flap position 1.