What happened
On 19 December 2020, a training flight conducted by Skövde Aeroclub resulted in an accident involving a small aircraft. The flight was intended to facilitate a student's transition to solo flight and included a touch-and-go maneuver. The crew consisted of a student, a flight instructor, and the Head of Training.
During the takeoff attempt, the aircraft failed to lift off the runway. Upon noticing an issue, the instructor intervened and attempted to abort the takeoff. However, the aircraft was traveling at a speed significantly higher than the rotational speed specified in the flight manual. Due to this excessive velocity, the remaining runway length was insufficient to bring the plane to a halt. The aircraft overran the runway end, traveling 175 meters onto the runway extension before flipping onto its back. All three occupants managed to egress the aircraft without injury.
The investigation
The investigation focused on the aircraft's configuration and the flight school's operational protocols. Investigators determined that the aircraft's trim position was not set to the standard takeoff configuration. Furthermore, the investigation examined the training organization's (DTO) safety management system and the regulatory oversight provided by EASA.
Findings
The primary cause of the accident was that the flight school's takeoff procedures were inappropriate. These procedures allowed the aircraft to reach a speed considerably higher than the required rotation speed without the crew noticing. The investigation also identified several contributing factors:
- The instructor's intervention occurred too late because they had an inaccurate perception of the takeoff progress.
- The combination of the aircraft's performance characteristics and the length of the runway created a false sense of safety regarding available margins.
- The flight school's training materials failed to address the relationship between speed, braking distance, and the designated decision point during takeoff.
- The flight school's safety management system lacked the necessary structure to proactively identify such operational risks.
Safety action
At a systemic level, the investigation identified a deficiency in EASA guidance material regarding how training should be conducted within a DTO. Consequently, a recommendation was made to EASA to evaluate whether a review of specific training exercises is necessary to mitigate safety risks, potentially through updated guidance material or enhanced safety promotion.