What happened
On 13 December 2002, an Arrow Air McDonnell Douglas DC-8-62 freighter, registration N1804, was landing at Singapore Changi Airport during a period of intense thunderstorm activity and heavy rain. While the approach was initially stabilized, the first officer, who was the pilot flying, experienced reduced visibility due to an ineffective windshield rain removal system on his side.
As the aircraft approached the runway, it began to float significantly above the surface. The aircraft eventually touched down approximately 1,500 metres from the end of Runway 20R, far beyond the intended touchdown zone. Despite the deployment of spoilers and thrust reversers, the aircraft could not stop within the remaining runway length. The aircraft veered slightly to the right, the nose landing gear detached, and the fuselage plowed through a muddy, grassy area before coming to a halt. There were no injuries among the four people on board.
The investigation
The investigation examined the aircraft's performance, the crew's decision-making, and the available environmental data. Investigators found that the aircraft's landing distance required was approximately 2,560 metres, yet it touched down with only 1,500 metres of runway remaining.
Technical analysis of the aircraft's documentation revealed that the Airplane Flight Manual Supplement was missing critical pages, including a chart used to determine landing distances for Flaps 35 configurations. Furthermore, while the crew used a Runway Analysis Manual to verify weight limits, this manual did not provide the necessary information regarding required landing distances. The investigation also looked into the effectiveness of the windshield rain removal system and the performance of the thrust reversers, noting that the fourth engine's reverser was slow to deploy.
Findings
- The crew landed long by approximately 1,300 metres.
- The pilot flying did not initiate a go-around despite losing visual contact with the approach and runway lights at 300 feet.
- The crew had not determined the required landing distance prior to touchdown.
- The windshield rain removal system was ineffective on the first officer's side.
- Critical landing distance charts were missing from the aircraft's flight manual supplement.
- The aircraft's landing weight was within limits, but the crew lacked the specific data to assess if the remaining runway was sufficient for the actual touchdown point.