What happened
On 30 May 2007, an Airbus A340, registration A40-LH, was performing a scheduled passenger service from Singapore Changi Airport. During the take-off roll on Runway 20C, the pilot noticed the runway centerline lights transitioning from white to alternating red and white, signaling the approaching end of the usable pavement. To prevent a runway excursion, the pilot applied Take-off Go Around (TOGA) power and executed an abrupt, high-rate rotation. The aircraft successfully lifted off at 141 knots, narrowly avoiding the end of the shortened runway.
At the time of the incident, the runway had been temporarily reduced from 4,000 meters to 2,500 meters due to resurfacing works. The flight crew had calculated their take-off performance based on the original, longer distance, as they were unaware of the temporary restriction.
The investigation
The investigation focused on why the crew failed to identify the reduced Take-off Run Available (TORA). Investigators found that the airline's Far East NOTAM system had not processed the specific Changi NOTAM regarding the runway shortening. Additionally, while a flight dispatcher had provided documents that supposedly included an extract of the relevant aeronautical information supplement, the crew reported they had received no briefing or documentation regarding the shortened runway.
Regarding communications, the investigation established that the flight crew had previously listened to an older ATIS broadcast that indicated Runway 20C was closed. Although the Air Traffic Control (ATC) officer informed the crew that the runway was now open, the controller did not explicitly mention the reduced length or the updated ATIS identifier. Furthermore, the crew did not notice the temporary guidance signs along the taxiway that indicated the shortened distance, likely due to high workload and the lack of an attention-grabbing mechanism on the signs.
Findings
- The airline's NOTAM processing system failed to incorporate the critical information regarding the runway shortening.
- The flight crew did not check the latest ATIS broadcast for updates prior to departure.
- The Air Traffic Controller did not clearly communicate the reduced runway length or confirm the current ATIS status to the crew.
- The airport guidance signs failed to effectively draw the crew's attention to the temporary change in runway length.
- The crew's performance calculations were based on an incorrect TORA of 4,000 m instead of the actual 2,500 m.