Synopsis
On 22 June 2016 at about 0940 local time, the Runway 1 Controller at Changi Tower observed an airfield maintenance vehicle, callsign Rover 32, moving on Taxiway W1 towards Runway 20R. The vehicle crossed the runway holding position without clearance, triggering a microwave barrier detector alarm. The controller immediately instructed Rover 32 to vacate the runway. An arriving B767 was cleared to land after the vehicle cleared the runway and landed safely. No damage or injuries occurred.
Factual Information
The driver of Rover 32 was a 66-year-old male employee of an airport maintenance service provider. He held a Category 1 Airfield Driving Permit and had 13.5 years of experience. On the day of the incident, he was tasked with inspecting taxiway pavement defects and markings. After attending a daily briefing, he requested and received clearance from Changi Tower to enter all taxiways. He proceeded to the WP/W1 junction area. According to the driver, he unknowingly crossed the runway-holding position because he was focused on looking for defects and missed the painted markings, stop bar lights, and runway guard lights. The vehicle reached about 60 m beyond the holding position but remained about 30 m from the runway edge.
The weather was clear with dry ground conditions. Recorded data from air traffic control audio and closed-circuit television were used for verification. A post-occurrence medical examination found no relevant medical or toxicological factors affecting the driver's performance.
Discussion
The investigation determined that the driver's crossing of the microwave barrier detector was due to his focus on inspecting pavement defects, causing him to miss visual cues. The report noted that a single person performing driving, communication, lookout, and inspection tasks faces competing attentional demands, which can affect situational awareness. The runway incursion warning system (AGLCMS MBD) in the control tower provided proactive detection and alerted the controller to the incursion.
Safety Actions
Following the incident, the airport maintenance service provider revised its procedures. Starting 24 June 2016, two employees are deployed for pavement inspections: one CAT 1 ADP holder drives and communicates with the tower, while the other inspects and maintains lookout. The company also shared lessons with operational staff. The aerodrome operator shared the occurrence with permit holders as a case study in its runway incursion prevention programme. No safety recommendations were proposed given the actions taken.