Occurrence
On 30 March 2017 at about 01:40 hours local time, a Boeing B787 (registration 9V-OJA) operated by Scoot and an Airbus A380-861 (registration A6-EUB) operated by Emirates were involved in a wing collision at Singapore Changi Airport. The B787 was taxiing along Taxiway WA while the A380 was being pushed back from parking bay C23 in Terminal 1 onto Taxilane U1. The left wing of the B787 struck the right winglet of the A380. There were no injuries.
Sequence of Events
At about 01:00 hours, two air traffic controllers began their shift for ground movement control at Changi Tower. One was an on-the-job training (OJT) trainee supervised by an OJT trainer. At 01:33 hours, the B787 completed pushback from bay E28 in Terminal 2. The OJT trainee instructed the flight crew to "taxi on greens" and hold short of Taxiway WA. The intended route was via Taxilane A6 and Taxiway NC3. The trainee did not verbalise the exact route.
At that time, the green taxiway centreline lights on Taxiway A6, NC3, and WA toward Runway 02L were illuminated. The OJT trainee planned to later reconfigure the lights to guide the B787 onto Taxiway WP after an arriving aircraft cleared Runway 02L. She did not activate the red stop bar lights at the intersection of NC3 and WA as she believed she could reconfigure the lights before the aircraft reached that point.
At about 01:34 hours, the OJT trainee cleared the A380 for pushback from bay C23. The pushback, which began at 01:37 hours, positioned the A380 tail-first onto Taxilane U1 facing south.
At 01:38 hours, the B787 crew reported approaching the intersection of NC3 and WA. The OJT trainee instructed them to "continue on the greens and hold short V6" – a reference to her intended route via WP. However, both controllers then focused on four departing aircraft near Runway 02L.
The B787 crew, seeing a continuous green light path leading left onto WA and no greens straight ahead (with red stop bars on the remaining section of NC3), turned left onto WA in accordance with the "taxi on greens" directive.
Collision
After turning onto WA, the B787 crew saw the A380 on U1. The first officer, who was taxiing, slowed the aircraft. Both pilots visually judged clearance to be sufficient. Meanwhile, the A380's tow tug driver stopped upon seeing the B787, uncertain of clearance. As the B787 passed, its left wing contacted the A380's right winglet. The tug driver heard scraping. The B787 crew felt a slight jerk and initially believed they had taxied over uneven ground, continuing taxiing.
Aftermath
At about 01:41 hours, the controllers turned back to the B787 and realised it was on WA instead of WP. Unaware of the collision, the OJT trainee instructed the B787 to proceed via V6 to WP for departure. At 01:42 hours, the A380 crew requested to return to the bay after learning of damage from the towing crew. ATC approved. The B787 crew, hearing the transmission, stopped and requested a visual inspection by cabin crew, who reported the left navigation light detached. The B787 then returned to a parking bay.
Damage
The B787 left wing sustained damage including delamination, scuffing of composite panels, bent and abraded skin panels, cracked wing tip light lenses, and severed static discharger wicks. The A380 right wing had delamination, cracks, and perforation of skin panels; scratches on the wing leading edge and slats; cracked ribs and spars; and severed static discharger wicks.
Personnel Information
The B787 pilot-in-command, male aged 58, held an Air Transport Pilot Licence with 17,000 total flying hours (314 on type). The first officer, male aged 35, held a Commercial Pilot Licence with 2,570 total hours (1,270 on type). The OJT trainer, female aged 26, had 4 years 5 months of experience at Changi Aerodrome. The OJT trainee, female aged 27, had 4 years 7 months in service; she had been in on-the-job training for Changi Aerodrome rating for five months and was deemed competent to manage traffic independently.
Meteorological and Aerodrome Information
At the time, taxiways and taxilanes were dry with visibility 10 km. The airport used an aircraft taxi guidance system with green centreline lights and red stop bars controlled by the Airfield Ground Lighting Control and Monitoring System (AGLCMS), designed to provide visual route guidance during night/low visibility operations.
Investigation Findings
The report discussed several factors: the use of the taxi guidance system, that ATC did not verbalise the intended taxi route (as not required by procedures), human perception challenges, information presentation in advisory charts, hazard identification, and preservation of recorders. No single probable cause was stated.