What happened
On May 16, 2012, Far Eastern Airlines flight FE 025, a Boeing MD-82 with registration B-28037, was performing a scheduled passenger service from Taipei Songshan Airport to Magong Airport. The aircraft was carrying 172 passengers and crew members.
During the initial approach to runway 02, the crew decided to execute a go-around due to significant tailwind components. Following the missed approach, the aircraft was vectored by Kaohsiung Approach. During this period, air traffic controllers advised of changing wind conditions, including a wind direction of 190 degrees at 13 knots with gusts up to 19 knots. The crew requested and was cleared for a VOR approach.
Upon the second approach, the aircraft touched down on runway 02 at 10:50:52 UTC. Despite the application of braking pressure, the crew reported that the brakes were unable to stop the aircraft. The plane subsequently overran the temporary runway end lights, coming to a halt approximately 328 feet (100 meters) beyond the temporary runway end. There were no fatalities or injuries, and the aircraft was subsequently removed from the runway by a tow vehicle.
The investigation
The Taiwan Transportation Safety Board (TTSB) examined the flight data recorder, cockpit voice recorder, and air traffic control communications. The investigation focused on the wind conditions at the time of landing, the crew's decision-making regarding the second approach, and the aircraft's braking performance. The investigation also reviewed maintenance records, specifically regarding engine thrust reverser synchronization, and evaluated the airport's operational status, including ongoing runway construction and the availability of ILS services.
Findings
- The crew failed to maintain adequate situational awareness regarding the wind conditions during the second approach, specifically failing to note that the tailwind component exceeded the 10-knot limit specified in the aircraft's flight manual.
- During the second approach, the tailwind at touchdown was approximately 14 knots, while the wind at the time of autopilot disconnection was approximately 21 knots.
- The crew did not properly utilize standard terminology when transferring aircraft control between the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring, leading to a momentary confusion regarding who was controlling the aircraft's direction.
- The crew did not request a continued ILS approach after the controller suggested a VOR approach, which would have been the preferred method to maintain stabilized parameters.
- Maintenance discrepancies were identified regarding the synchronization of the Engine Pressure Ratio (EPR) and Thrust Lever Angle (TLA) when thrust reversers were deployed, which the airline had not adequately addressed in its inspection checklists.
- Air traffic controllers suggested changing the approach type (from ILS to VOR) without fully considering the time and procedural requirements needed for the crew to transition safely.